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Abstract
Shareholder primacy is the most fundamental concept in corporate law and
corporate governance. It is widely embraced in the business, legal, and academic
communities. Economic analysis and policy arguments advance a normative theory
that corporate managers should maximize shareholder wealth. Academic literature
invariably describes shareholder primacy as a “norm.” But whether the concept is
“law” is contested because, remarkably, we still do not have a coherent legal theory.
Our understanding of a fundamental tenet of the field is flawed and incomplete.
This article presents a positive legal theory of shareholder primacy. It answers the
questions: Is shareholder primacy law? What form of law is it? How does it work?
The core prescription to maximize profit is misunderstood as a social norm because
it cannot be in the form of an enforceable rule, the framework of a board’s fiduciary
duty. Such form of law would be internally incoherent with the structure of
corporate law. However, to influence behavior the concept of law is not limited to a
rule‒sanction form. Pervasive judicial acceptance of a principle can legitimate a
rule and thus impose a strong internal sense of obligation. This article conducts the
first empirical study of case law discussing profit maximization for the period 1900
to 2016. It shows that shareholder primacy has become a Hartian obligation and a
rule of law. The rule does not exist in a single locus duty, but instead is a
filamentary principle that weaves through many other rules of corporate law and
the architecture of the corporate and market systems. This article shows how the
obligation, albeit unenforceable, is efficacious nonetheless.
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INTRODUCTION
A foundational concept of corporate law and corporate governance is
the principle of shareholder primacy. It expresses the idea that shareholders
have the priority interest in both economics and governance of the
corporation: shareholders are said to be the principal in a principal-agent
relationship on whose behalf the corporate enterprise serves.1 Shareholder
primacy instructs the board to manage the corporation solely for the
purpose of maximizing shareholder wealth.
The shareholder wealth maximization norm is important because it
goes to the most basic question in the field of corporate law: What is the
purpose of the corporation and corporate law? The broad canvass
answer―corporations are wealth-producing socioeconomic legal constructs
that should profit shareholders―is without controversy. Only when we
See Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control,
53 STAN. L. REV. 539, 545 (2000).
1
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examine the question deeper does it reveal important social implications.2
Should shareholder profit be maximize at the expense of all other interests?
Are efficiency and equity irreconcilable? What about externalities and
ethics? Are there social obligations within a complex democratic market
system? Is shareholder profit related to social inequity? These questions do
not have easy normative answers, both in the theory of the corporation and
in the practice of corporate governance. The debate is as old as the dawn of
the modern corporation and has persisted over many generations of
economic history and academic scholarship. 3 One side of the argument
answers that the sole obligation of a corporate manager is to maximize
shareholder profit within the bounds of lawful activity.4 Others disagree,
arguing that shareholder profit need not always take priority over other
interests or consideration.5
Despite persistent criticism, the idea of shareholder primacy has been

The debate on corporate purpose has modern constitutional and socio-political
dimensions. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014); Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
3
Compare these debates in the 1930s, 1960s, and 1990s. See A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate
Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) (managers should exercise
power “only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders”); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom
Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1932) (corporation “has a
social service as well as a profit-making function”); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM 133 (1962) (there is “only one social responsibility of business―to use it resources
and engage in activities designed to increase its profits”); JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE
NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 24-25 (1967) (economists and businesspersons “have abandoned,
however tacitly, their commitment to maximization”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense
of Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1423, 1425 (1993) (defending shareholder primacy); Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as
Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409, 1411
(1993) (proposing stakeholder theory).
4
See , e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 33; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle
with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 155, 171
(2012) (embracing Milton Friedman’s idea and arguing “corporate law requires directors,
as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to maximize profits for
the stockholders”); supra note 3.
5
See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Framing a Purpose for Corporate Law, 39 J. CORP. L. 713,
720 (2014); David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013 (2013);
LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS
INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012); Robert J. Rhee, Fiduciary Exemption for
Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, and the Hobson’s Choice During a National
Crisis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 661, 735-36 (2010); Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in
Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 638 (2006); Einer Elhauge,
Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005); supra note 3.
2
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widely accepted.6 However, its legal status remains uncertain even today.
This is an unsatisfactory state of knowledge, all the more conspicuous since
the field of corporate law has been well developed in law and scholarship.
Shareholder primacy is said to be a central tenet of corporate governance.
It is invariably described by corporate law scholars as a “norm,” but seldom
“law.” Critics diminish it further to an “ideology” or “dogma.” 7 Even
advocates consistently describe it as a social norm.8 Other than undue and
hackneyed debate around an old Michigan case,9 we lack a legal theory of
shareholder primacy. The debate on shareholder primacy is had at the level
of policy and economic rationale, advancing normative arguments for or
against the idea.
This is the first article to advance a complete and coherent legal theory
of shareholder primacy. It answers these basic questions: Is shareholder
primacy law? If it is, how does the law work (achieve compliance)? To
answer these questions, this article conducts the first empirical review of
judicial discussion of shareholder profit maximization in the era of the
modern corporation, the period 1900‒2016. This review shows that courts
have pervasively embraced the concept that corporate managers should
maximize shareholder wealth.
This article posits that shareholder primacy cannot be stated as a pithy
rule of law and enforceable sanction. Such a legal form would irreconcilably
conflict with other foundational rules of the corporate system. A basic
aspect of corporate law as we know it―the separation of ownership and
control―would become incoherent. The inability to find a precise locus of
law does not mean that law does not exist. Shareholder primacy is not a
norm originating from a shared belief in the community, independent of
legal origin or influence. It is law obligating managers to maximize value.
It exists as a filament of the corporate system, weaving through various the
architecture of the corporate system, its rules of law, corporate governance
practices, and market mechanisms. Judicial recognition of the concept of
shareholder primacy has created a Hartian obligation that is a part of
See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that
corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”); infra
note 55.
7
STOUT, supra note 5, at 2 (“ideology”); David Millon, Shareholder Primacy in the
Classroom After the Financial Crisis, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 191, 192 (2013) (“dogma”).
8
See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v.
Ford, 3 VA. J. L. & BUS. REV. 177, 179 (2008); Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1423.
9
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
6
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corporate law.10
This article does not advance a normative theory of shareholder wealth
maximization or advance the idea that shareholder primacy promotes an
equitable or responsible society. The normative arguments for and against
have been well developed in legal, business, and economic scholarship.
This article presents a positive legal theory explaining the structure of a
complex law. The question—“what is the law?”—has not received
sufficient empirical or theoretical analyses. This article contributes to the
literature by presenting the first complete, coherent theory of positive law
of shareholder primacy: The theory explains the reason why shareholder
primacy must be in a form of law without sanctions and the precise
mechanism by which the law has influenced managerial behavior toward
compliance. 11 The academic, policy, and legal communities, including
courts, are served by a better understanding of shareholder primacy’s legal
foundation and its cause and effect on the economic system.
Before starting the analysis, this article notes an important definitional
distinction that is central to the theory advanced here. Although scholars
sometimes use the terms duty and obligation interchangeably,12 this article
distinguishes them. Duty is defined in the doctrinal sense of a cognizable
fiduciary duty subjecting directors or others to legal sanction for breach.13
Obligation is defined in the jurisprudential sense of a government
prescription that is not attached to a sanction, though it is a form of law.14
In short, the theory of law advanced here is that while there is no duty to
maximize profit, courts have imposed an obligation to do so and this
prescription is efficacious even though it is unenforceable. This obligation
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) (3d ed. 2012).
See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253,
1263 (1999) (“The process by which norms originate and are adopted as a result of changes
in actors’ belief-systems is extremely important generally, and is of special importance in
explaining the origin and adoption of many norms that are significant in corporate law.”);
Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603,
1647 (2000) (“What are the mechanisms by which law influences behavior apart from the
deterrent effect of state sanctions? That question remains a fertile area for further
investigation.”).
12
See, e.g., Leslie Green, Law and Obligations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, at 514 n.1 (eds. Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro, 2002).
Some fields of law make a clear distinction. For example, non-corporate business entity
statutes distinguish duty and obligation, wherein duty refers to fiduciary duty and
obligation refers to some other legal commitment. See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. LIMITED LIAB. CO.
ACT § 409(a),(d) (2006); UNIF. LIMITED P'SHIP ACT § 408(a),(d) (2001); REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP
ACT § 404(a),(d) (1997). See also Gerber v. Enterprise Products Holdings, LLC, 67 A.3d 400,
418-19 (Del. 2013) (explaining the difference between fiduciary duty and the obligation of
good faith and fair dealing).
13
See infra note 36.
14
See infra Section IV.B. (presenting a theory of an obligation as law).
10
11
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is the law of shareholder primacy. This article unpacks how this idea works
in the practice of corporate governance.
This article is organized into four sections. Section I presents the current
understanding of shareholder primacy as a social norm, and it explains the
core tension between shareholder primacy and managerial authority in the
structure of corporate law. Section II discusses rules of law and legal aspects
that partially advance the effect of shareholder primacy, including the law’s
treatment of inter-security conflicts, sale of corporate control, the market for
corporate control, and executive pay. Section III presents empirical data
from federal and states cases discussing the concept of shareholder profit
maximization from 1900 to 2016. Section IV advances a complete and
coherent theory of positive law, showing the mechanism by which courts
and the legal system have created an obligation that, albeit unenforceable,
is efficacious nonetheless.
I.

THE PROBLEM OF LEGAL THEORY

Shareholder primacy is a legal enigma. It is a fundamental tenet of
corporate law.15 Yet, its legal authority seems strangely scant. In other fields
of law, foundational laws are apparent in the primary sources of law. Every
field has them. 16 The first statutes enacting a fundamental concept are
modeled. 17 Progenitor cases are frequently cited and relied upon as
authority.18 Shareholder primacy is different. It is difficult to find the locus
of law, either a well-established body of case law or a specific statute
imposing a duty to comply with the command. Due to this real legal
ambiguity, shareholder primacy has been debate principally on policy
grounds and its legal status has been vigorously contested.
See Grant Hayden & Matthew Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem and the Exclusive Shareholder
Franchise, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1217, 1218 n.1 (2009) (“normative foundation for modern
corporate law theory”); Douglas R. Cole, E-Proxies for Sale? Corporate Vote-Buying in the
Internet Age, 76 WASH. L. REV. 793, 831 n.192 (2001) (“central tenet of traditional corporate
law”).
16
See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.,
162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1028); Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854); Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
17
For example, virtually every state has enacted a version of the uniform partnership
laws. See REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT (1997); UNIF. P'SHIP ACT (1914).
18
For example, Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.), stating the
standard for a partner’s fiduciary duty of loyalty, has been cited 1,144 time in federal and
state court opinions as of November 22, 2016.
15
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A. Whither the Law
The uncertain legal status is seen when one searches for legal authority
in the traditional way that lawyers find the law: cases, statutes, and
regulations stating a command, prohibition, or permission. Shareholder
primacy seems to exist not as a pinpoint citation, but in the ether. It is real
in that no one disputes the sense of obligation in the boardroom and
executive suites, but finding the law’s command is elusive. No corporation
statute of the fifty states imposes a duty on the board to manage a business
corporation to maximize shareholders wealth. All corporation statutes
simply provide that the corporation may engage in any lawful activity.19 In
fact, a substantial number of statutes provide the opposite―that the board
may consider the interests of constituents beyond shareholders.20
Case law imposing a duty to maximize profit is so scant that there is
hackneyed over-reliance on Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., a 1919 case from
Michigan.21 The case famously involved a dispute between Henry Ford and
the Dodge brothers over whether the Ford Motor Company, a close
corporation that Ford controlled, should pay dividends to shareholders in
light of enormous accumulation of capital surplus and whether the
company should be permitted to make large capital investments. Ford
justified his business decisions on his philosophy that a corporation should
“employ still more men, to spread the benefits of this industrial system to
the greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their
homes.”22 The Michigan Supreme Court rejected this economic philosophy
and rebuked Ford: “A business corporation is organized and carried on
primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are
to be employed for that end.”23
For an old case from Michigan dealing with the legal issue of minority
oppression in a close corporation, Dodge v. Ford has assumed an outsized

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b); MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.01(a). Most
corporate charters track the statute and make no reference to profit maximization. See, e.g.,
Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Facebook, Inc., Art. III (May 22, 2012).
20
See Elhauge, supra note 5, at 737; D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm,
23 J. CORP. L. 277, 279-80, 289 (1998). See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 607.0830(3); infra note 139 (citing
cases where courts reject shareholder primacy on the basis of constituency statutes).
21
170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
22
Id. at 671. “The true industrial idea is not to make money. The industrial idea is to
express a serviceable idea, to duplicate a useful idea, by as many thousands as there are
people who need it.” HENRY FORD, MY LIFE AND WORK: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF HENRY
FORD at 92 (1922).
23
170 N.W. at 684 (emphasis added).
19
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prominence in legal scholarship.24 Its celebrity is due to two factors. First,
Henry Ford and the Ford Motor Company, no less the Dodge brothers, are
fabled figures in American industry. Second, this history wraps a judicial
statement of shareholder primacy in crystalline form. This second factor
gives Dodge v. Ford its prominence in legal scholarship. It is a polestar. There
has not been another such unconditional general embrace by a state
supreme court. Despite its prominence as an iconic standard-bearer of
shareholder primacy, the case has been rarely cited in the past century by
other jurisdictions. 25 In Delaware, it has only been cited three times for
other propositions.26 In almost one hundred years, only the West Virginia
Supreme Court has restated Dodge v. Ford’s iconic proposition, but in the
context of justifying broad authority to engage in corporate philanthropy, a

See STOUT, supra note 5, at 25 (“oversized effects of a single outdated and widely
misunderstood judicial opinion”). The case has been cited in 819 law review articles, as of
November 22, 2016. It is also prominent in the business law curriculum of law schools. See,
e.g., ROBERT J. RHEE & RUSSELL B. STEVENSON, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: LAW AND
POLICY (9th ed. 2017 forthcoming); CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON,
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 270-73 (7th ed.
2014); M. Todd Henderson, The Story of Dodge v. Ford: Everything Old Is New Again, in
CORPORATE LAW STORIES at 37-75 (Mark J. Ramseyer, ed., 2009).
25
The case is cited in 42 state court opinions as of November 22, 2016. Compare this
to the 1,144 citations to Meinhard v. Salmon, supra note 18. Of the 23 non-Michigan cases,
most cite the case for the proposition related to rebutting the business judgment rule to
compel dividends. Blackwell v. Nixon, 1991 WL 194725, at *4 (Del.Ch. 1991); Alaska
Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 277 (Alaska 1980); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.
of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 514 (Mass. 1975); Hall v. John S. Isaacs & Sons Farms,
Inc., 163 A.2d 288, 295 (Del. 1960); Gordon v. Elliman, 119 N.E.2d 331, 334 (N.Y. 1954);
Meadows v. Bradshaw-Diehl Co., 81 S.E.2d 63, 69 (W.Va. 1954); Swinton v. W.J. Bush &
Co., 102 N.Y.S.2d 994, 997 (Sup.Ct. 1951); Ostlind v. Ostlind Valve, 165 P.2d 779, 789 (Ore.
1946); Johnson v. Lamprecht, 15 N.E.2d 127, 131 (Ohio 1938); Dodge v. Scripps, 37 P.2d 896,
902 (Wash. 1934); City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Hewitt Realty Co., 177 N.E. 309, 311 (N.Y.
1931); Jones v. Van Heusen Charles Co., 246 N.Y.S. 204, 208-09 (App.Div. 1930); Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, 222 N.Y.S. 532, 537 (Sup.Ct. 1927); Gesell v. Tomahawk Land
Co., 200 N.W. 550, 556 (Wisc. 1924). Several courts have cited Dodge v. Ford for the
proposition related to minority oppression by a majority shareholder, or a general
statement of law regarding bad faith, fraud, or breach of fiduciary duty by a manager. Hill
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 692 (App. 2008); Zidell v. Zidell, Inc.,
560 P.2d 1086, 1089 (Ore. 1977); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779-80 (Ill.App. 1968);
Long v. Norwood Hills Corp., 380 S.W.2d 451, 476 (Mo.App. 1964); Rogan v. Oliver, 110
So.3d 980, 983 (Fla.App.Ct. 2013). Two cases cite Dodge v. Ford for propositions related to
corporate philanthropy. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 584 (N.J. 1953); E. I.
Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Clark, 88 A.2d 436, 444 (Del. 1952) (Tunnell, J., dissenting).
26
See supra note 25.
24
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concept that is at least in tension with maximizing shareholder profit.27
There is another anomalous case. In eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v.
Newmark, the founders of Craigslist, a website created for users to list
products and services for sale, adopted a poison pill plan to thwart eBay’s
attempt to acquire Craigslist. 28 Delaware has long legitimized the use of
poison pills,29 as long as the defensive measure is a reasonable response to
the threat posed to the corporation under Unocal. 30 The founders of
Craigslist argued that the poison pill was necessary to protect Craigslist’s
social values and community-centric corporate culture, which would be
threatened by the acquisition of the corporate giant eBay.31 The Delaware
Chancery Court rejected the argument and its reasoning echoed the Dodge
v. Ford proclamation:
Jim and Craig did prove that they personally believe craigslist
should not be about the business of stockholder wealth
maximization, now or in the future. . . . Having chosen a for-profit
corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary
duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards
include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the
benefit of its stockholders. The “Inc.” after the company name has
to mean at least that. Thus, I cannot accept as valid for the purposes
of implementing the Rights Plan a corporate policy that
specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the
economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit
of its stockholders . . . . Directors of a for-profit Delaware
corporation cannot deploy a rights plan to defend a business
strategy that openly eschews stockholder wealth maximization―at
least not consistently with the directors’ fiduciary duties under
Delaware law.32
This statement strongly embraces shareholder primacy. It is a trial
court opinion of a single judge, but still an influential court. If Dodge v. Ford
is a polestar, eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark is a sign of the season,
a trade wind blowing toward shareholder-centrism.
The point still stands: case law is scant. In the over one hundred years
of the modern era of corporations and in light of a well-developed corporate
law, there does not seem to be a weight of case law establishing a duty on
27
28
29
30
31
32

See Gilbert v. Northfolk & W. Ry. Co., 171 S.E. 814, 815 (W.Va. 1933).
16 A.3d 1, 15-16 (Del.Ch. 2010) (Chandler, C.).
Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
16 A.3d at 32.
Id. at 34-35 (emphasis in original).
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boards to maximize shareholder profit in managing a going concern. In this
respect, these cases could just as well be characterized as outlier opinions
rather than crystalline examples of existing principle. In light of the
disconnection between Dodge v. Ford’s prominence and its actual influence
on corporate law, some commentators have dismissed the case as largely
irrelevant.33
B. Conflict with Managerial Authority
Unlike other business entities, corporate law presupposes a manager in
the form of a board and vests the board with managerial authority.34 A duty
to maximize profit, subjecting the board’s decision to judicial review, would
impose a framework of a rule and enforceable sanction (hereinafter “rule‒
sanction”). In the study of jurisprudence, such a law is said to be Austinian
in the sense of an order backed by the threat of government power.35 It is
blackletter law that fiduciary duties in corporate law are liability rules; the
breach of the duties of care and loyalty may result in legal liability for
various parties subject to the liability scheme.36 The basic tenets of corporate
law are the separation of ownership and control 37 and the primacy of
managerial authority.38 As a conceptual matter, a rule‒sanction framework
of a duty to maximize profit presents an irreconcilable conflict between
Millon, supra note 5, at 1023; STOUT, supra note 5, at 25-29; Lynn A. Stout, Why We
Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 168-74 (2008). See Smith, supra
note 20, at 322 (arguing that due to the business judgment rule “the shareholder primacy
norm is nearly irrelevant”). But see Bernard S. Sharfman, The Importance of the Business
Judgment Rule, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2888052
(arguing that the policy behind the business judgment rule is grounded in shareholder
wealth maximization).
34
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT. § 8.01(a).
35
See HART, supra note 10, at 16-17 (discussing Austin’s concept of law in JOHN
AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832)).
36
See, e.g., RBC Capital Markets, LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015); In re Rural
Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54, 110 (Del.Ch. 2014); Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2011);
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858 (Del. 1985); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Guth v. Loft, 5 A2d 503
(Del. 1939).
37
N. Am. Catholic Educ. Prog. Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del.
2007); Malone v. Brincat, 722, A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998); Randy J. Holland, Delaware’s Business
Courts: Litigation Leadership, 34 J. CORP. L. 771, 779 (2009).
38
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT. § 8.01(a); Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1990); Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
33
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authority and accountability because profit-seeking is the core managerial
function in a business corporation.39
Shareholder primacy is clearly unenforceable on its own term because
the business judgment rule would defeat any claims based on a failure to
maximize profit. 40 Corporate managers formulate business strategy. A
rule‒sanction is antithetical to the core concept of the business judgment
rule. In over one hundred years of modern corporate law, has a state
supreme court imposed liability for breach of fiduciary duty on the specific
ground that the board, in managing operational matters, failed to maximize
shareholder profit, though it made the decision informedly, disinterestedly,
and in good faith?41 That case does not exist. In fact, many cases show just
the opposite. Courts have held that shareholders cannot challenge a board’s
decision on the specific grounds that, for example: the company paid its
employees too much;42 it failed to pursue a profit opportunity;43 it did not
maximize the settlement amount in a negotiation; 44 it failed to lawfully
avoid taxes.45 There are classic textbook cases where courts have rejected
attempts of shareholders to interfere with the board’s decisions on the
argument that their views of business or strategy would have maximized

See Bainbridge, supra note 38, at 604-05 (noting the conflict between authority of
managers and accountability to shareholders); Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey,
The Role of the Board in Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals
Compared, 44 BUS. LAW. 503, 522 (1989) (“The power to hold to account is the power to
interfere and, ultimately, the power to decide.”). See also MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid
Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1126 (Del. 2003) (“The most fundamental principles of corporate
governance are a function of the allocation of power within a corporation between its
stockholders and its board of directors.”).
40
STOUT, supra note 5, at 29; Macey, supra note 8, at 180-81; Smith, supra note 20, at
286; D. Gordon Smith, Response: The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 985,
1002 (2008). See Bratton, supra note 5, at 716 (“A legal mandate to maximize makes no sense
in a dynamic economy.”).
41
See Fisch, supra note 5, at 651 (“Although Dodge v. Ford is frequently cited, no
modern court has struck down an operational decision on the ground that it favors
stakeholder interests over shareholder interests.”).
42
See, e.g., In re The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. S’holder Litig., 2011 WL 4826104
(Del.Ch. 2014); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
43
See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill.App. 1968).
44
See, e.g., Carlton Investments v. TLC Beatrice Int’l Holdings, Inc., 1997 WL 305829
(Del.Ch. 1997).
45
See, e.g., Kamin v. American Express Co., 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App.Div. 1976).
Taxpayers have a right to pursue lawful tax avoidance strategies. Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). Yet, there is no duty under corporate law to lawfully avoid tax. See
Freedman v. Adams, 2012 WL 1345638, at *13 (Del.Ch. 2012); Seinfeld v. Slager, 2012 WL
2501105, at *3 (Del.Ch. 2012).
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shareholder value.46
A rule‒sanction would be difficult and inefficient to implement
through a liability rule. Commanding a board to maximize profit upon
threat of sanction does not shed light on how it should do so. Such a
command is different from instructing a person not to drive negligently.
Profit is a score, not a strategy. An indeterminate set of potential business
strategies, each subject to unique business risk, must be reviewed and
second-guessed through the litigation system. 47 In concrete terms, there
may be no way to tell how profits can be maximized for the New York
Times as between two strategies: firing a number of reporters and thereby
cutting employee costs, or hiring more and thereby increasing costs. The
former could be characterized as a financial strategy based on the
company’s margin structure; the latter could be a strategy based on
producing the highest quality product. A specific corporate action may be
motivated by profit maximization, but it is not a deterministic end of such
motive. The profit motive may result in stochastic corporate actions.48
If there is an enforceable duty, courts will struggle over the proper
allocation of authority and accountability for business actions and profits.
Any new division between deference and judicial review would require
some judicial determination of whether profit has been maximized.
Foundational rules of corporate law, such as the separation of ownership
and control and the business judgment rule, would be tested in a conceptual
shift. This conflict would ultimately be inefficient and incoherent.
Neither Dodge v. Ford nor eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark
conflicts with this analysis. In both cases, the specific holdings did not rest
on or establishes an independent fiduciary duty to maximize profit,
enforceable by sanctions. The holding in Dodge rested on an abuse of
discretion in Ford’s dividend decision in the context of a minority freeze

See, e.g., Kamin v. American Express Co., 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App.Div. 1976);
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill.App. 1968).
47
See E. Norman Veasey, Should Corporate Law Inform Aspirations for Good Corporate
Governance Practice―or Vice Versa?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2184-85 (2001); In re Pure
Resources, Inc. Shareholders Litigation. 808 A.2d 421, 434-35 (Del.Ch. 2002).
48
See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate
Objective Function, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235, 245 (2002) (“[V]alue maximizing says nothing
about how to create a superior vision or strategy.”); Roe, supra note 52, at 2072 (noting that
corporate law's instructions to managers to enhance shareholder profit do not “determine
what they do”).
46
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out. 49 The holding in eBay rested on the court’s application of the Unocal
enhanced standard of review applicable to corporate defensive measures.50
As a doctrinal matter, neither case can fairly be read to establish a
cognizable duty to maximize profit, though clearly the admitted failure to
maximize profit by the controlling shareholders in both cases was a
significant, if not dispositive, factor in the holdings that rested on other
doctrines of corporate law.
C. Academic Discourse and Consensus
In light of the seemingly scant law and the doctrinal problem of a rule‒
sanction framework, academic discourse on shareholder primacy has
revolved around theoretical and policy arguments (after the usually
obligatory discussion of Dodge v. Ford).51 Legal scholarship almost always
describes shareholder primacy as a social norm. 52 This descriptive is
significant because a norm is generally not considered law and is not subject
to legal sanction. 53 The unclear legal status of shareholder primacy is
evident in academic discourse.
In an influential essay, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman argue
that as an observed matter corporate law has reached an ultimate
consensus: “The point is simply that now, as a consequence of both logic
and experience, there is convergence on a consensus that the best means to
this end (that is, the pursuit of aggregate social welfare) is to make corporate
managers strongly accountable to shareholder interests and, at least in
170 N.W. 668, 682-85 (Mich. 1919). Several scholars have correctly noted that the
holding relates specifically to minority oppression by withholding dividends. Smith, supra
note 20, at 315; STOUT, supra note 5, at 26-27.
50
16 A.3d 1, 28-35 (Del.Ch. 2010).
51
The rise of shareholder primacy as an idea has been well described in legal
scholarship. See STOUT, supra note 5, at 18-19; Millon, supra note 7, at 1025-34; Fisch, supra
note 5, at 656-61. In brief, shareholder primacy arose from theoretical work by economists
in the 1970s and 1980s, resulting in subsequent law and economic conception of corporate
law. See, e.g., Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288
(1980); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs, and Capital Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 38 (1996).
52
A Westlaw search of the terms “shareholder primacy norm” and “shareholder
wealth maximization norm” shows that a total of 618 articles used one of the two terms as
of November 22, 2016. See, e.g., James D. Nelson, The Freedom of Business Association, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 461, 502 (2015); Bratton, supra note 5, at 720; Fisch, supra note 5, at 637;
Bainbridge, supra note 38, at 573; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, 465-66 n.41; Mark
J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PENN.
L. REV. 2063, 2064 (2001); Smith, supra note 20, at 277.
53
See infra notes 190-192 and accompanying text.
49
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direct terms, only to those interests.”54 This “standard” model reflects an
internalization of shareholder-centric ideology by a broad consensus of
business, government, and legal elites. 55 Absent in the analysis was
discussion of law and its relationship to observed internalization of
shareholder primacy.56
In an article specifically analyzing Dodge v. Ford, Jonathan Macey
argues that the case has “legal effect” and is a “positive account of what
corporate law actually is,”57 but has also noted the limited evidence of law
in the form of a rule‒sanction. He explains that the reason we rarely see case
like Dodge v. Ford is because managers are better coached and are more
willing to dissemble than Ford was to get the benefit the business judgment
deference. 58 Shareholder primacy is “the law on the books, if not in
practice.”59 The concept is like a street sign that clearly posts a speed limit,
but the actual norm is to drive faster than the posted sign. The problem is
not the lack of clarity of the rule, but the lack of enforceability of the rule.60
Shareholder primacy is unenforceable because managers can hide behind
the business judgment rule as long as they do not reveal their motive as
Ford had done.61 Thus, on the one hand profit maximization “actually is”
corporate law, but at the same time Macy calls it a “norm.”62
In a recent essay, Leo Strine, the chief justice of the Delaware Supreme
Court, defends shareholder primacy from a normative perspective.63 This
essay is notable in two respects. First, invoking Milton Friedman’s famous

Hansmann & Kraakman, note 6, at 441.
Id. at 439. See Nelson, supra note 52, at 501-02 (“widely accepted social norm among
business leaders”); STOUT, supra note 5, at 4 (“accepted as a truth” by business and policy
elites); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary
Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 798 & n.35 (2002) (“most corporate law scholars embrace
some variant of shareholder primacy”); Smith, supra note 20, at 278 (fully internalized by
managers); Fisch, supra note 5, at 640 (“overwhelmingly embraced” by scholars). See also
Edwards v. Morrow, 725 S.E.2d 366 (N.C.App. 2012) (“From an economics standpoint, it is
considered a given that the primary aim of a for-profit entity is profit maximization.”).
56
The article cited no primary legal authority, except a minor citation to Weinberger
v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). Id. at 456 n.28.
57
Macey, supra note 8, at 178, 180.
58
Id. at 180.
59
Id. at 181.
60
Id.
61
See supra notes 33, 40 & 41.
62
Id. at 179. See George A. Mocsary, Freedom of Corporate Purpose, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV.
1319, 1342 (calling it both “law” and “norm”).
63
Strine, supra note 4.
54
55
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manifesto on profit maximization, 64 Strine states that “corporate law
requires directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith
strategy to maximize profits for the stockholders.”65 Linking shareholder
wealth maximization to the duty of loyalty is a serious matter in the practice
of corporate law because money damages against a director for a breach
cannot be exculpated. 66 With that said, Strine caveats his statement by
reciting the primacy of managerial authority: “The directors, of course,
retain substantial discretion, outside the context of a change of control, to
decide how best to achieve that goal and the appropriate time frame for
delivering those returns.”67 This comment acknowledges the incoherence
of subjecting managerial authority to a rule‒sanction for the failure to
maximize profit.68 Second, like Hansmann and Kraakman’s earlier essay,
Strine’s essay is notable in that he does not make a sustained legal argument
for shareholder primacy. He cites and discusses Dodge v. Ford and eBay v.
Newmark, but this discussion punctuates a largely policy-laden argument
supported by academic literature on shareholder primacy.69
Lastly, the contestability of the legal status of shareholder primacy is
evident in a recent New York Time opinion editorial debate between Lynn
Stout and Stephen Bainbridge, two eminent scholars of corporate law. Stout
argues that corporate law does not mandate a legal duty to maximize
profit.70 But Bainbridge argues that shareholder primacy has been the law
since Dodge v. Ford. 71 On the basic question of defining the law, their
positions at first glance seem contradictory.
The above review of literature is not a criticism, but simply confirms
the earlier observation that pinpointing the law of shareholder primacy has
been elusive. Without a positive legal theory, the academic discourse does
not rely on the law so much as it defaults to normative arguments to suggest
See supra note 4.
Strine, supra note 4, at 155, 171. Strine further echoes Milton Friedman when he
suggests that profit maximization promotes “the public interest.” Id. at 135-36.
66
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).
67
Strine, supra note 4, at 155.
68
Delaware jurists have suggested that shareholder primacy is “a matter of principle,”
but stopped short of calling it law. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The
Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067,
1079 (2002).
69
See Strine, supra note 4, at 145-55.
70
Lynn Stout writes: “There is a common belief that corporate directors have a legal
duty to maximize corporate profits and ‘shareholder value’―even if this means skirting
ethical rules, damaging the environment or harming employees. But this belief is utterly
false.” Lynn Stout, Corporations Don’t Have to Maximize Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015).
71
Stephen Bainbridge writes: “Despite contrary claims by some academics and
Occupy Wall Street-type partisans, this [Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.] remains the law today.”
Stephen Bainbridge, A Duty to Shareholder Value, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015).
64
65
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what law or corporate governance norm is or should be. The implicit
assumption is that the suasion of normative theory, manifesting in a social
norm, is the root cause of managerial internalization and behavior.
Even today, the legal status of a fundamental concept of corporate law
is uncertain and contestable. The legal theory advanced in this article show
that both Stout and Bainbridge, and other commentators, are correct in their
precise positions: shareholder primacy is not a duty, but it is law; it is
broadly obeyed and thus efficacious, but it is unenforceable. Advocates and
critics of shareholder primacy are not as far apart as they seem to be. The
apparent conflict in their positions is grounded in two factors: first, an
incompleteness of the concept of law resulting in an implicit assumption
that the law must take the form of an independent fiduciary duty; second,
an underappreciation of the role of courts in recognizing and advancing a
legal obligation. A coherent legal theory can bridge the apparent divide in
conflicting positions and our understanding of the most important rule of
corporation law as it has come to be developed by courts.
II. PARTIAL SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
Shareholder primacy does not exist as a single locus rule‒sanction, but
instead weaves through a series of rules of corporate law and the
architecture of the corporate and market systems. Corporate law partially
achieves the end of shareholder primacy through three discrete pathways.
First, in realm of corporate finance, when there is an inter-security conflict
of interest among capital providers involving common stock, corporate law
mandates that the value of common stock must be maximized over other
securities. Second, in the realm of takeovers, corporate law imposes a duty
to maximize common stock value when the corporation is selling control.
Third, in the vast realm of day-to-day managerial decisionmaking in a
going concern, there is not a single locus, easily identifiable rule of law that
mandates profit maximization, but the corporate and market systems,
constructed through the legal system, steer managers toward the end of
shareholder primacy even when corporate law empowers the primacy of
managerial authority.
A. Inter-Security Priority
Shareholder primacy is clearly evident in the realm of corporate
finance. Among securityholders, common stockholders are owed fiduciary
duty and are preferred over other securityholders. Although the variety of
securities a corporation can issue is limited only by the freedom of contract,
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there are three principal classes of securities: debt, preferred stock, and
common stock. These financial instruments often present inter-security
conflicts among securityholders.
Consider the relative positions of creditors and common stockholders.
The interests of creditors and shareholders can conflict because managers,
in the pursuit of shareholder wealth, can make decisions that externalize
risk to creditors, a form of opportunism that enriches shareholders at the
cost of creditors. 72 Although corporate law provides some protection to
creditors,73 the creditor’s principal protection is the ability to negotiate for
the terms of credit through contract law.74 Outside of insolvency, creditors
are not owed fiduciary duty,75 but of course common stockholders are.76
This makes economic sense since creditors have priority rights to corporate
income and assets and thus take less financial risk than common
stockholders.77
The primacy of shareholders over creditors is seen in several doctrines.
Creditors invoke the doctrine of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing when the issuer corporation takes an action that benefits
shareholders at their expense and there are no express contractual
protections in the credit contract. Courts have limited the application of this
contract doctrine, essentially rejecting an independent cause of action for
bad faith action against creditors. Absent an identifiable connection to a
bargained for term in the contract, courts generally reject these claims. 78
A more direct example illustrating the primacy of common stock over
See generally Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U.
PA. L. REV. 1907 (2013).
73
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(a); MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40(j); Klang v Smith's
Food & Drug Centers, Inc. 702 A.2d 150 (Del. 1997).
74
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES at 2 (1971); Mann v.
Oppenheimer & Co., 517 A.2d 1056, 1061 (Del. 1986); Production Res. Group v. NCT Group,
Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 790 (Del.Ch. 2004).
75
N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla 930 A.2d 92, 99,
101-02 (Del. 2007); Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988); Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc.,
508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del.Ch. 1986). See Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 303 (Del. 1988) (no
duty to convertible bondholders).
76
Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998).
77
See RICHARD BREALEY, STEWART MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, THE PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 493 n.12 (11th ed. 2013).
78
See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F.Supp. 1504,
1520 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“The sort of unbounded and one-sided elasticity urged by plaintiffs
would interfere with and destabilize the market.”); Winshall v. Viacom Intern., Inc., 76
A.3d 808, 816 (Del. 2013) (“Rather, a party may only invoke the protections of the covenant
when it is clear from the underlying contract that the contracting parties would have
agreed to proscribe the act later complained of . . . had they thought to negotiate with
respect to that matter.”).
72
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debt is seen in a seminal Delaware case on coercion and exit consents. In
Katz v. Oak Industries Inc., bondholders objected to a coercive exchange offer
that was conditioned on the tendering bondholders providing the company
exit consents to amend the indenture. 79 The corporation extended the
exchange offer as a part of a restructuring, which required removing
protections that hindered the restructuring. The complaining bondholders
argued that the exchange offer was coercive and that the amendment was
designed to strip nontendering bondholders of their protective covenants.
They averred that “the purpose and effect of the Exchange Offers is to
benefit Oak’s common stockholders at the expense of the Holders of its
debt.”80 The court held that the exchange offer was in fact coercive, but not
wrongfully so.81
It is the obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the
long-run interests of the corporation's stockholders; that they may
sometimes do so “at the expense” of others (even assuming that a
transaction which one may refuse to enter into can meaningfully
be said to be at his expense) does not for that reason constitute a
breach of duty. It seems likely that corporate restructurings designed to
maximize shareholder values may in some instances have the effect of
requiring bondholders to bear greater risk of loss and thus in effect
transfer economic value from bondholders to stockholders.82
The issuing corporation must respect the legal duties to creditors under
contract law, but otherwise the board has a duty to prefer the interest of
shareholders over creditors. When a board benefits common stockholders
through the intentional infliction of economic loss on creditors (e.g.,
through risk shifting in Katz), absent an impairment of capital or fraudulent
conveyance, the board and the corporation act pursuant to the duty to
shareholders.
Consider next the relative positions among preferred stockholders and
common stockholders. The priority of interest is more nuanced since both
are stockholders, but ultimately Delaware law has evolved to prefer clearly
the interest of common stockholders over that of preferred stockholders.
At common law, unless preferences are found in the certificate of
79
80
81
82

508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
Id. at 879.
Id. at 880-82.
Id. at 879 (emphasis added).
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incorporation, all shares of stock are equal and thus court do not recognize
a preference in forms of stock.83 Contractual preferences provide preferred
stockholders benefits and also limitations. The typical preferences are
priorities over dividend and liquidation and a limitation on participation
beyond the fixed dividend.84 When the right asserted is not a preference,
fiduciary duties are owed to preferred stockholders as well. 85 Delaware
cases followed this common law rule. 86 However, Delaware has steadily
undermined the rule of equality.
In the 1990s, Delaware law evolved in favor of common stockholders.
Rather than viewing preferred stock as a form of stock with contractually
negotiated preferences but otherwise standing in equal dignity to common
stock, Delaware courts emphasized the contractual nature of preferred
stock, thus treating preferred stock more like debt than common stock.87
In Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, preferred stockholders (early
venture capital investors in a struggling public company) desired to
liquidate the company and common stockholders sought to continue the
enterprise by seeking new capital funding.88 In light of Delaware’s evident
policy preference in favor of business decisions promoting the continuation
of a going concern,89 the court’s ruling in favor of common stockholders is
not so remarkable. However, the justification for its ruling is revealing:

Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 593-94 (Del.Ch. 1986); Shanghai
Power Co. v. Delaware Trust Co., 316 A.2d 589, 593 (Del.Ch. 1974), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
by Judah v. Delaware Trust Co., 378 A.2d 624 (Del. 1977). See MCG Capital Corp. v. Maginn,
2010 WL 1782271, at *6 (Del.Ch. 2010) (“I begin with the proposition that all stock is created
equal. By this I mean that all classes of stock enjoy the same rights and privileges unless an
affirmative expression alters those rights.”).
84
ROBERT J. RHEE, CORPORATE FINANCE at 312-13 (2016).
85
See Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del.Ch. 1986) (stating
that where there is no stated preference “the existence of such right and the scope of the
correlative duty may be measured by equitable as well as legal standards”). See also MCG
Capital Corp. v. Maginn, 2010 WL 1782271, at *6 (Del.Ch. 2010) (holding that preferred
stockholders have standing to bring derivative actions).
86
See, e.g., Orban v. Field, 1997 WL 153831 (Del.Ch. 1997); In re FLS Holdings Inc.
S’holder Litig., 1993 WL 104562 (Del.Ch. 1993); Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537
A.2d 1051 (Del.Ch. 1987); Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584 (Del.Ch. 1986);
Dalton v. American Inv. Co., 490 A.2d 574 (Del.Ch. 1985).
87
Preferred stock is a hybrid instrument that has the features of both debt and equity.
See RHEE, supra note 84, at 311-12. See generally Richard M. Buxbaum, Preferred Stock―Law
and Draftsmanship, 42 CAL. L. REV. 243 (1954).
88
705 A.2d 1040 (Del.Ch. 1997).
89
See, e.g., Orban v. Field, 1997 WL 153831 (Del.Ch. 1997); Credit Lyonnais Bank
Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 WL 277613 (Del.Ch. 1991); Katz v.
Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del.Ch. 1986).
83
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While the facts out of which this dispute arises indisputably entail the
imposition by the board of (or continuation of) economic risks upon
the preferred stock which the holders of the preferred did not want,
and while this board action was taken for the benefit largely of the
common stock, those facts do not constitute a breach of duty. . . . The
special protections offered to the preferred are contractual in nature.
The corporation is, of course, required to respect those legal rights.
But, aside from the insolvency point just alluded to, generally it will
be the duty of the board, where discretionary judgment is to be exercised, to
prefer the interests of common stock . . . to the interests . . . of preferred stock,
where there is a conflict. See Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc.90
This passage departs from the traditional understanding under
common law that, if a preference is not stated, stocks are considered equal.91
Under Equity-Linked Investors, absent a special preference in the corporate
contract, the interest of common stockholders may be elevated over the
interest of preferred stockholders. Furthermore, by citing Katz v. Oak
Industries as authority and analogizing the permissibility of transferring
risk from common stockholders to other securityholders, the court pushes
the analysis of preferred stock toward the same analytical framework
applicable to credit contracts.
Several recent cases in Delaware have further strengthened the hand of
common stockholders. In In re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation, the board
pursued a merger in which virtually all of the merger consideration would
go the preferred stockholders due to the triggering of a liquidation
preference.92 Common stockholders got nothing. A common stockholder
averred in the complaint that the board, comprised mostly of directors
elected by preferred stockholders, breached its fiduciary duty to them. The
court noted: “in circumstances where the interests of the common
stockholders diverge from those of the preferred stockholders, it is possible
that a director could breach her duty by improperly favoring the interests
of the preferred stockholders over those of the common stockholders.” 93
The court set forth a principle that, unless a preference is expressly
Equity-Linked, 705 A.2d at 1042 (emphasis added).
“At common law and in the absence of an agreement to the contrary all shares of
stock are equal. . . . [W]here however the right asserted is not to a preference as against the
common stock but rather a right shared equally with the common, the existence of such
right and the scope of the correlative duty may be measured by equitable as well as legal
standards.” Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 593-94 (Del.Ch. 1986).
92
2009 WL 2225958 (Del.Ch. 2009).
93
Id. at *7.
90
91

Vol. 102

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

21

provided in the corporate contract, where the interests of preferred and
common stockholders conflict the latter’s interest is preferred. 94 This
proposition―stated in both Equity-Linked and Trados―turns the original rule
in common law upside down, because under traditional common law all
stocks are treated equally unless there is a stated preference right or
limitation therefrom.
In LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, the issue again involved the
allocation of merger consideration between convertible preferred and
common stockholders. 95 The certificate did not set a contractual merger
price to be paid to the preferred stockholders. The preferred stockholders
argued that the fair allocation should exceed the “as converted” value of
their stock due to the unique features of the stock and the circumstance of
the preferred stockholders.96 The court rejected this argument, reasoning
that the contractual right of conversion determines the duty owed by the
board to the preferred stockholders. In this case, the board “was entitled to
favor the interests of the common stockholders.”97 The court acknowledged
that recent decisions discussing fiduciary duties to preferred stockholders
conflict with earlier cases.98 The court attempted to harmonize the conflict.
When the rights of the preferred are found in the contract, the board must
In subsequent proceeding, the chancery court ultimately held that, under the entire
fairness standard, the merger consideration to the common stockholder was fair. In re
Trados Shareholder Litigation, 73 A.3d 17 (Del.Ch. 2013). The court emphasized in the
analysis:
94

To reiterate, the standard of conduct for directors requires that they strive
in good faith and on an informed basis to maximize the value of the
corporation for the benefit of its residual claimants, the ultimate
beneficiaries of the firm's value, not for the benefit of its contractual
claimants. In light of this obligation, “it is the duty of directors to pursue
the best interests of the corporation and its common stockholders, if that
can be done faithfully with the contractual promises owed to the
preferred.”
Id. at 41-42 (quoting LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, 990 A.2d 435, 452 (Del.Ch.
2010)).
95
990 A.2d 435 (Del.Ch. 2010).
96
Previously, Delaware courts have considered the unique features of the preferred
stock and the circumstance of their holders when considering the fairness of the merger
consideration. See, e.g., Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584 (Del.Ch. 1986); In
re FLS Holdings Inc. S’holder Litig., 1993 WL 104562 (Del.Ch. 1993).
97
LC Capital, 990 A.2d at 438.
98
Id. at 446-47 (citing apparent tension in recent cases such as In re Trados Inc. S’holder
Litig., 2009 WL 2225958 (Del.Ch. 2009), with older cases such as Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels,
Inc., 509 A.2d 584 (Del.Ch. 1986) and In re FLS Holdings Inc. S’holder Litig., 1993 WL 104562
(Del.Ch. 1993)).
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honor them, but it does not owe any further “unspecified fiduciary
beneficence on the preferred at the expense of the common.” 99 When,
however, there is no contractual basis for treatment of the preferred, the
board must engage in gap-filling and attempt to fairly reconcile the
competing interests of the common and preferred. Echoing Equity-Linked
and Trados, the court endorsed the rule “that it is the duty of directors to
pursue the best interests of the corporation and its common stockholders, if
that can be done faithfully with the contractual promises owed to the
preferred.”100
In an insightful article, William Bratton and Michael Wachter observe
that preferred stock is subject to the tug and pull of conflicting analytical
paradigms of corporate law and contract law.101 Courts sometimes invoke
the contract principle and at other times the corporate law prism, and they
seemingly do this without a coherent theory. 102 Bratton and Wachter
conclude that any apparent inconsistency is dispelled by judicial outcome
preference (“the preferred always lose”): “Still, we are left with corporate
treatment when corporate treatment benefits the common and contract
treatment when contract treatment benefits the common.” 103 Why the
outcome preference? They answer that Delaware courts ultimately are
driven by the “common stock-value maximization norm.” 104 This article
agrees with their cogent analysis and conclusion. In the realm of
stockholder class conflicts, corporate law mandates a priority duty to
common stockholders. The opinions in Equity-Linked, Trados and LC Capital
clearly state this.
The law of corporate finance shows that, in the absence of bargained
for contractual protections, there is a clear preference for the interest of
common shareholders over other capital providers. This observation is now
trivially obvious with respect to creditors. Corporate law has also recently
LC Capital, 990 A.2d at 448-49 (relying on HB Korenvaes Investments, L.P. v. Marriott
Corp., 1993 WL 205040 (Del.Ch. 1993)).
100
Id. at 452. The trend toward protection of common stockholders has continued. See
Carsanaro v. Bloodhound Technologies, Inc., 65 A.3d 618 (Del.Ch. 2013).
101
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PENN.
L. REV. 1815, 1821, 1900-01 (2013).
102
Id. at 1901.
103
Id. at 1901, 1902. But see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Response: Poor Pitiful or Potentially Powerful
Preferred?, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 2025 (2013).
104
Bratton & Wachter, supra note 101, at 1816, 1823, 1824, 1877, 1882, 1905. “The
court's disposition to favor the common is unsurprising: Delaware sells a product, the
buyers of which tend to be holders of common stock or their management representatives.”
Id. at 1901.
99

Vol. 102

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

23

treated preferred stock more like debt by emphasizing contractual rights
and less like stock. This trend has left common stock as the clearly preferred
securityholder among capital providers. The law mandates that boards
must maximize the wealth of common stockholders.
B. Revlon Duty
In the takeover realm, a board ordinarily has significant control of
decisions.105 This discretion may include consideration of “the impact on
‘constituencies’ other than shareholder (i.e., creditors, customers,
employees, and perhaps even the community generally).” 106 However,
under Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., a board has a duty
to maximize shareholder profit once the object is no longer “to protect or
maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder.”107 The
director’s role changes from “defenders of the corporate bastion to
auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale
of the company.”108 In other words, once the board no longer has a future
duty to manage the business, its present duty is to maximize value for
shareholders.
Beyond an all cash sale of the target, 109 there are three scenarios when
Revlon applies: (1) when a corporation initiates an active bidding process
for sale or breakup of the company; (2) when a target abandons its longterm
strategy and acquiesces to a sale of the company to bidder; (3) when a
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land, 81 FORD. L. REV. 3277,
3286 (2013); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 973, 974-75 (2002).
106
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). See Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) (“[A]bsent a limited set
of circumstances as defined under Revlon, a board of directors, while always required to
act in an informed manner, is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in
the short term, even in the context of a takeover”).
107
506 A.2d 173, 192 (Del. 1986). The Revlon duty is not a separate duty independent
of the duty of care and loyalty, but “application in a specific context of the board's fiduciary
duties of care, good faith, and loyalty.” RBC Capital Markets, LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816,
858 (Del. 2015).
108
Id. at 182. See McGowan v. Ferro, 859 A.2d 1012, 1032 (Del.Ch. 2004); Equity–
Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1054–55 (Del.Ch.1997).
109
Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1058 (Del.Ch. 1997). An all
cash deal is not a precondition to triggering Revlon. See, e.g., C&J Energy Services, Inc. v.
City of Miami General Employees’ & Sanitation Employees’ Retirement Trust, 107 A.3d
1049 (Del. 2014) (assuming without deciding that a transaction involving a share exchange
in which acquirer shareholders owned 53% and target shareholders 47% of the post-merger
company triggered Revlon); In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720 (Del.Ch. 1999)
(triggering Revlon in a mixed cash and stock consideration deal).
105
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transaction results in a change of control.110 These situations are contextual,
and scholars have debated the scope of the Revlon duty. 111 The precise
contours of Revlon duty is not within the scope of this article. The relevance
of Revlon here is that in a specific transaction zone, Revlon provides a rule‒
sanction framework that mandates shareholder wealth maximization. A
decision in the takeover arena is not an ordinary decision. In a change of
control of the company, it is the terminal decision. In the Revlon zone, a
board’s final duty is to maximize shareholder profit.
Although Revlon is an enforceable rule, it also illustrates the tension
between the enforcement of shareholder primacy and the law of managerial
authority. Courts do not provide a judicial blueprint for boards to follow.112
The application of Revlon to a transaction and board conduct is not
algorithmic. “No court can tell directors exactly how to accomplish that
goal, because they will be facing a unique combination of circumstances,
many of which will be outside their control.”113 Instead, Revlon imposes a
heightened judicial scrutiny for reasonableness under which “directors are
generally free to select the path to value maximization.” 114 Thus, Revlon
imposes a rule‒sanction framework, but courts still accept, with a watchful
eye, the primacy of managerial authority as a pragmatic constraint on the
assessment of breach and liability.
Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp., Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1989-90 (Del. 1994).
See Stout, supra note 33, at 172 (“The case has become nearly a dead letter.”); Millon,
supra note 5, at 1035 (“The Revlon duty . . . arises only in a narrow range of
circumstances . . . .”); Bainbridge, supra note 105, at 3337-38 (providing three circumstances
in which Revlon duty is triggered); Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon,
71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 172 (2014) (characterizing Revlon as a “narrow, silo-like
doctrinal isolation”); Mohsen Manesh, Defining by Dictum: The Geography of Revlon-Land in
Cash and Mixed Consideration Transactions, 59 VILL. L. REV. 1, 33 (2014) (“The boundaries of
Revlon-land have never been clearly defined precisely . . . .”); Fisch, supra note 5, at 651
(“The Revlon decision . . . applies to an extremely small set of cases.”); Bruner, supra note
52, at 531 (suggesting that the Revlon duty “is in fact quite limited”).
112
Barkan v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del.1989); C & J Energy
Services, Inc. v. City of Miami General Employees' and Sanitation Employees' Retirement
Trust, 107 A.3d 1049, 1067 (Del. 2014). See Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651
A.2d 1361, 1374 (Del.1995) (“[E]nhanced judicial scrutiny mandated ... is not intended to
lead to a structured, mechanistic, mathematical exercise ... [it is] a flexible paradigm that
jurists can apply to the myriad of ‘fact scenarios' that confront corporate boards.”).
113
Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 2009).
114
In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 595–96 (Del.Ch. 2010). See In re
Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1000 (Del.Ch. 2005) (“[T]he enhanced
judicial review Revlon requires is not a license for law-trained courts to second-guess
reasonable, but debatable, tactical choices that directors have made in good faith.”).
110
111
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C. Market and Architecture
The duties associated with inter-security conflicts and takeovers under
Revlon are specific transactional situations. The vast majority of managerial
decisions in the day-to-day management of a going concern are not subject
to a rule‒sanction framework. 115 Board decisions are protected by the
business judgment rule. If a board determines that the corporation should
pay its employees above market wages or incur exceptional cost to surpass
regulatory compliance standards on the reason that it would be in “the best
interests of the corporation and its shareholders,”116 this incantation would
cloak the board in the shield of the business judgment rule. It would not
matter that a plaintiff can demonstrate the merit or demerit of the business
decision from a financial viewpoint.117
In theory, the law does not seem to hold managers accountable for not
pursuing the end of shareholder primacy. Commentators have argued that
shareholder primacy is irrelevant in actual business management. 118 The
point is correct insofar as a corporate manager has broad authority so long
as it acts informedly, disinterestedly, and in good faith. 119 Any rational
decision can be justified on some abstract benefit to the long-run interest of
the corporation and shareholders. However, the logical end of expansive
managerial authority does not necessarily diminish shareholder primacy to
a social norm of the business community.
See supra Section I.B.
See Rhee, supra note 5, at 699 (“[W]ith the incantation of ‘long-term interest of the
corporation and shareholders,’ the threat of liability is whisked away by the spirit of
plausible good faith.”). See also Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261,
1287 (Del. 1989); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006);
Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985); Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d
91, 103 n.30 (Del. 2006); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del.1993); King
v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc., 12 A.3d 1140, 1151 (Del. 2011); Unitrin, Inc. v. American
General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 n.10 (Del. 1995); Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500
A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985).
117
The fiduciary duty of care in corporate law is an artful concept, under which
substantively poor actions are not a breach of care. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,
264 (Del. 2000) (“Due care in the decisionmaking context is process due care only.”); In re
Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“[A] decision
substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through ‘stupid’ to ‘egregious' or
‘irrational,’ provides no ground for director liability”). See generally Robert J. Rhee, The Tort
Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139 (2013).
118
See supra notes 33, 40, 41 & 49 and accompanying text.
119
See STOUT, supra note 5, at 31 (“The business judgment rule thus allows directors
in public corporations . . . a remarkably wide range of autonomy in deciding what to do
with the corporation’s earnings and assets.”).
115
116

2017

LEGAL THEORY OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY

26

The legal system has conceived a better way of achieving the end of
shareholder primacy without the complexity and cost of a rule‒sanction
framework. Let’s assume for argument sake that shareholder primacy is the
desired policy end (a contestable normative proposition). Corporate law is
founded on the principle of the separation of ownership and control and
the primacy of managerial authority. How can the law influence managerial
behavior toward the end of shareholder primacy?
Lawrence Lessig provides a helpful way to think about the general
problem of affecting behavior toward a desired outcome. 120 He suggests
that behavior can be regulated by four mechanisms: (1) law in the Austinian
sense of a rule backed by the threat of government; (2) social norms through
non-legal community enforcement; (3) markets through the device of price;
(4) architecture, which he defines as any feature of the world as it is found
or made.121 These four mechanisms affecting behavior are not independent.
The law can affect the efficacy of each of the other mechanisms.122
Figure 1: Law and Mechanisms Inducing Behavior
Law

Market

Behavior

Norm

Architecture

For example, the social norm against smoking can be influenced by
laws against cigarette advertisement and designation of cordoned smoking
spaces. The market for insurance can be used to incentivize seat belt use
through subsidization of insurance rates for safe behavior. The architecture
of discrimination against the physically handicapped can be diminished by
building codes that mandate accessibility. Thus, the law can influence the
efficacy of other mechanisms.
This model provides a helpful framework for understanding how
corporate law influences managerial behavior toward shareholder primacy.
120
121
122

Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUDIES 661 (1998).
Id. at 662-63.
Id. at 667-69.
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The unstated assumption in labeling shareholder primacy as a “norm” is
that a law of shareholder primacy must be in Austinian form, such as
fiduciary duty. Because shareholder primacy cannot be in such form
without irreconcilable conflict with managerial authority, it is reduced to
the mechanism of norms. This belief is incorrect.
By calling shareholder primacy a norm, we are simply stating the
observation that managerial behavior is consistent with shareholder wealth
maximization. In other words, something is influencing observed behavior,
and since a legal duty does not exist, we assume, erroneously, that the cause
must be a social norm. The principal cause of inducing conforming
behavior is not through the mechanism of a norm, but instead through the
mechanisms of law, market and architecture (the latter two being enabled
and influenced by law and the legal system writ large). The workings of
these three mechanisms, then, legitimize and reinforce an existing norm of
the business community.123
With respect to the architecture of markets, shareholder primacy tends
to be more robust when product competition in the market is strong, as is
the case of American markets.124 An efficient market limits the agency cost
of broad managerial control because stock prices would incorporate such
cost into valuation. When corporations operate within a liquid capital
market, two forms of direct incentives influence managers. The legal system
writ large creates a market for corporate control, and it incentivizes
executive pay that is substantially linked to share price.
First, the market for corporate control provides the incentive to increase
and maintain share price.125 The laws relating to mergers and acquisitions
advance shareholder primacy and directly affect board and managerial
incentives and conduct. In a liquid capital market, share price is directly
related to shareholder profit maximization. To avoid an unsolicited
takeover, managers are incentivized to maximize share price. The pricing
mechanism of the market, a feature of architecture supported by law,
enforces shareholder primacy.126
Second, executive compensation has moved toward a “pay-for-

See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907 (1996)
(suggesting that “government deserves to have, and in any case inevitably does have, a
large role in norm management”); Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM.
L. & ECON. REV. 1, 38-42 (2001) (explaining ways in which the government affects norms).
124
Roe, supra note 52, at 2063.
125
See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110 (1965).
126
“Hostile takeovers were, and despite the rise of the poison pill still are, an engine
of shareholder wealth maximization.” Roe, supra note 52, at 2074.
123
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performance” model that is linked to share price.127 The state of executive
compensation today has been influenced by law.128 The current incentive
system is linked to shareholder wealth. The phenomenal rise of executive
compensation over the past several decades corresponds temporally to the
rise of shareholder primacy. 129 As flawed as it currently is, 130 executive
compensation is a pricing mechanism for managerial talent and outcomes.
The law and the legal system link the stock value of shareholders and the
architecture of the corporate system and capital markets. These linkages
clearly affect managerial incentive to maximize profit.131
If shareholder primacy is only a consensus among managers,
shareholders, and academics and subject only to community reprobation,
then the most accurate description would fit the definition of a norm.
However, the market and the architecture of the corporate system constrain
the otherwise expansive legal discretion afforded to corporate managers
and steer, partially at least, managerial decisions toward the end of
shareholder wealth maximization.132
See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentive―It's Not How Much You
Pay, But How, 68 HARV. BUS. REV. 138 (1990); Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy,
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990).
128
The tax code incentivizes pay-for-performance. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (limiting
deductibility of executive compensation to $1 million unless it is a qualified performancebased compensation). Absent a breach of duty, corporate law does not review the amount
of compensation awarded. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d
27 (Del. 2006); In re The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. S’holder Litig., 2011 WL 4826104
(Del.Ch. 2014).
129
Compare infra Section III.B and Charts 2 and 3 (showing rise of shareholder primacy
in courts since the 1980s), with Robert J. Rhee, Intrafirm Monitoring of Executive Compensation,
69 VAND. L. REV. 695 (2016) (showing rise of executive compensation since the 1980s). See
also Rock, supra 72, at 1917 (“The biggest development since the 1980s is that CEOs now
have large amounts of equity and equity-linked compensation.”).
130
A legion of scholarship has been critical of executive compensation based on either
the amount of compensation paid or the decoupling of pay and performance. See, e.g., Rhee,
supra note 129; Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code,
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877 (2007); LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). See also
THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 271-303 (2014) (shows how the
rise of “supermanagers” has become a major factor of social inequity in the U.S.).
131
See Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 HARV. L. &
POL'Y REV. 1, 14-15 (2008); STOUT, supra note 5, at 71-72; Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock,
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adapting Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 871, 884 (2002).
132
See Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON
HALL L. REV. 909, 911 (2013) (“Hostile takeovers and, later, equity-based executive
127
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III. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY IN COURTS 1900‒2016
The above rules and aspects of the legal system exemplify the
multifaceted mechanism through which shareholder primacy works—
through enforceable rules of corporate law in specific transactional spaces
and through law-facilitated negative and positive incentives in the
corporate system. However, these facets only partially explain the legal
mechanism of shareholder primacy. A complete, coherent legal theory,
which is set forth in infra Section IV, must explain the law’s effect on the
entire spectrum of managerial conduct. Central to this explanation is the
role of courts in advancing shareholder primacy as a rule of law.
This section provides the results of an empirical survey of judicial
opinions discussing shareholder wealth maximization in the period 1900 to
2016. It shows that since the 1980s, there has been a marked increase in
discussion of shareholder profit maximization in judicial opinions. This
phenomenon raises these questions: (1) How did the courts respond to the
wave of shareholder-centric consciousness in the business and academic
communities? (2) Did the responding judicial discussion, rhetoric, and
expectation affect the legal obligations of boards?
A. Methodology and Raw Data
This article surveys judicial opinions discussing the concept of
maximizing or increasing shareholder profit in the period from 1900 to
2016, the era of modern corporations and liberal corporate law.133 A broad
search term was used to capture cases that discuss at some level enhancing
shareholder economic interest.134 This article does not claim that the search
process produced all judicial decisions that discussed the concept of

compensation, began to emerge as the new forces creating incentives for managers to focus
on share value.”).
133
The New Jersey Incorporation Act of 1896 was the first liberal corporation statute.
Stephen B. Presser & Richard E. Simpson, Adjusting to the Managerial Revolution: The Law of
Corporations in the Federal Courts of Delaware 1900-1941, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 730
(1982). In 1899, Delaware enacted its own liberal corporation statute. Id. at 732.
134
The Westlaw state and federal case law directories were searched using this search
term: (maximiz! or enhanc! or increas!) /15 (shareholder! or stockholder!) /15 (profit! or
wealth! or valu!). The search term was devised to capture statements like this: “Business
corporations must engage the political process in instrumental terms if they are to maximize
shareholder value.” Citizens United v. Federal Election Com'n, 558 U.S. 310, 454 (2010)
(Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). No federal or state court
opinion has ever used the term “shareholder primacy” independently.

2017

LEGAL THEORY OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY

30

shareholder primacy. The search term is not perfect. 135 Rather, the claim
here is that the search process systematically captured a large volume of
data over a long period, and the data show distinct patterns of judicial
discussion, analysis, and rhetoric throughout the modern era of
corporations.
The search criteria produced a raw data set of 3,035 cases. Even the raw,
unfiltered data show a distinct pattern. The raw data, shown in Chart 1,
suggest that courts have increasingly discussed the idea of maximizing
shareholder profit because since the 1980s corporate transactions have
sought to achieve that end.136
Chart 1: All Judicial Opinions (raw data)
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The search term, of course, produced many false positives. Two types
of false positive cases were identified and discarded: (1) irrelevant cases

Interestingly, Dodge v. Ford does not come up under this search term because the
key discussion does not meet the Boolean search criterion: “A business corporation is
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the
directors are to be employed for that end.” 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (emphasis
added). The missing term is the word derivative “maximize!” or “increase!” or “enhance!”
This miss does not undermine the validity of the search criterion. The search term captured
many important law cases discussing shareholder primacy. See, e.g., eBay Domestic
Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del.Ch. 2010); Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (1989); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del.Ch. 1986).
136
Charts showing data for the decade 2010‒2019 present actual data for the 7-year
period 2010‒2016 and linear extrapolations for the remaining 3-year period 2017‒2019.
135
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that are just random hits from the Boolean search term;137 (2) cases where
the idea of maximizing shareholder wealth was raised by a party or was a
point of fact, such as a statement in a press release or proxy, but the court
did not directly engage this assertion with its own voice.138 This second type
of case could be relevant to some broader analysis of shareholder primacy,
but recitations of facts do not reveal judicial thinking. Thus, under the
method here, they are strictly irrelevant cases.
Although the second type of false positives were discarded, they yield
three pertinent observations. First, not surprisingly, corporate litigants,
both shareholders and managers, routinely invoke the concept of profit
maximization when advancing a complaint or a defense. This type of case
was far more numerous than random hits. Since the 1980s, parties have
inundated courts with transactions and claims asserting shareholder profit
maximization. Second, again not surprisingly, courts do not reproach
corporate litigants for advancing facts or arguments based on shareholder
wealth maximization. 139 At minimum, court have not found the concept
inconsistent with corporate law; more likely, they have tacitly accepted the
principle as a part of corporate law and governance. Third, the case law
reveals that the lexicon of “maximizing” shareholder wealth, vis-à-vis
“increasing” or “enhancing,” is ubiquitous. This clearly preferred linguistic
choice expresses the maximand as the corporate purpose.140
B. Rise of Shareholder Primacy in Courts
The culling of false positives produced a final list of cases where the
court discussed in its own voice and thought the concept of shareholder
primacy. Relevant cases were, then, further sorted into two broad
categories: Revlon-invoking cases and non-Revlon cases. Because Revlon
See, e.g., ev3, Inc. v. Lesh, 114 A.3d 527, 540 (Del. 2015) (discussing maximization
of earn-outs).
138
See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v. Liberty Media Corp., 29 A.3d 225,
231-32 (Del. 2011) (quoting the company’s CEO).
139
When courts explicitly reject the concept, they were bound by state constituency
statutes. See Murray v. Conseco, Inc., 766 N.E.2d 38, 44 (Ind.App. 2002) (Indiana statute);
Dixon v. Ladish Co., Inc., 785 F.Supp.2d 746, 753 (E.D.Wisc. 2011) (Wisconsin statute);
Stilwell Value Partners I, L.P. v. Prudential Mut. Holding Co., 2008 WL 1900945, at *13
(E.D.Pa. 2008) (Pennsylvania statute); Shepard v. Meridian Ins. Group, Inc., 137 F.Supp.2d
1096, 1113 (S.D.Ind. 2001) (Indiana statute); In re Guidant Corp. Shareholders Derivative
Litig., 2006 WL 290524, at *7-8 (S.D.Ind. 2006) (Indiana statute); In re PHLCORP, 1992 WL
85013, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Pennsylvania statute). Only a few courts or judges have argued
against profit maximization independent of constituency statutes. See Day v. Staples, Inc.,
555 F.3d 42, 56 (1st Cir. 2009); Bonoff v. Troy, 187 A.D.2d 302, 303 (N.Y.App.Div. 1st Dep’t
1992); Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1182 (7th Cir. 1987) (Cudahy, J., concurring).
140
See infra Section III.B and Table 4.
137
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mandates an enforceable duty to maximize shareholder wealth, Revloninvoking cases are uninteresting in the sense that they must recite the rule
in Revlon even if a court ultimately determined that the transaction does not
come within the Revlon zone. Non-Revlon cases are more revealing because
any comment by the court, speaking in its own voice, reveals its thought
process on shareholder wealth maximization when it is not required to do
so under the Revlon rule or a required recitation thereof.
Mirroring the raw data, the refined data shows that judicial discussion
of shareholder-centric concepts have figured prominently in corporate
litigation starting in the 1980s. The chart below shows federal and state nonRevlon cases.
Chart 2: Non-Revlon Federal and State Cases
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The Delaware experience is consistent with the above data. Delaware
cases show that judicial discussion of shareholder-centric concepts have
figured prominently in corporate litigation starting in the 1980s. The table
and the chart below provide the data, categorized into Revlon and nonRevlon cases.
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Table 1: Delaware cases from 1900 to 2016
Period
1900─1979
1980─1989
1990─1999
2000─2009
2010─2016
1900─2016

Revlon
0
17
19
17
35
_______
88

Non-Revlon

0
4
7
18
25
_______
54

Total Cases
0
21
26
35
60
_______
142

Chart 3: Delaware Cases
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Charts 2 and 3 show that in the period 1900‒1979 courts were virtually
silent on the concept of shareholder primacy. The hockey stick pattern of
cases should not be surprising in light of well-known economic, business,
and intellectual histories. It is confirming. The increased discussion of
maximizing shareholder profit is associated with economic and legal ideas
on the theory of the firm and agency cost from the 1970s and 1980s, which
provide the theoretical foundation of shareholder primacy. 141 The 1980s
brought forth “tectonic forces” in the form of hostile takeovers, innovations
in junk bond financing, economic globalization, and sustained economic
arguments in the business and academic communities for profit
maximization.142 The case law, embodying the collective judicial thinking,
See supra note 51.
In the twentieth century, there had always been two competing conceptions of the
corporation: the “property conception” that views the corporation as the private property
of shareholders, and the “society entity conception” that views the corporation as a social
141
142
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reflects these developments. The table below tracks the number of cases by
decades.
Table 2: Non-Revlon cases from 1900 to 2016
Period
1900─1909
1910─1919
1920─1929
1930─1939
1940─1949
1950─1959
1960─1969
1970─1979
1980─1989
1990─1999
2000─2009
2010─2016

Delaware
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
7
18
25

Other States
1
1
1
3
1
1
1
2
3
3
21
10

Federal
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
24
22
28
30

We can also pinpoint the rise of shareholder primacy in courts to a
specific point in the 1980s. The years 1980-1984 were unremarkable and
looked very similar to the 1970s in the number of cases. In the time period
1900 to 1984, the search criteria produced no Delaware case that discussed

entity endowed with a social purpose. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the
Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261 266-72 (1992); ADOLPH A. BERLE, POWER 206
(1967). These two conceptions have coexisted in an uneasy détente for much of the
twentieth century. Allen supra at 264-65; BERLE, supra at 206. The 1980s brought to the
surface the underlying tensions between the two conceptions of the corporation.
The dynamic forces in corporation law are easy to identify. The evolution
of the junk bond market and takeover entrepreneurs, the growth of institutional
investors, and the striking emergence of a global economy came together in the
1980s to force massive change in the private sector of our economy. In that
process, tensions and antinomies in corporation law theory that had been lying
beneath the surface for a very long time, were forced out into the open. As a
result, during the 1980s corporation law became not boring and marginal, but
important, even fascinating. Articles on corporate theory found their way into
leading journals. Basic questions excited argument, and the most basic
questions―What is a corporation? What purpose does it serve?―became the
stuff of wide discussion and of statutory activity. Everything old became new
again.
Allen, supra, at 263-64.
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shareholder primacy in its own voice.143 The first case in Delaware was in
1985, the seminal decision by the Delaware Supreme Court in Moran v.
Household International, Inc. where the court validated the poison pill.144 In
that year, the court also decided several other landmark cases in the
takeover realm.145 In 1986, portending the new era of shareholder-centrism,
Delaware courts decided two seminal cases in corporate law, which
partially but substantially advanced shareholder primacy in specific
transactional spaces: Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc. and Revlon v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc.146 The table below tracks the number of cases in each
year of the decade.147
Only one case could be read as dealing with profit maximization. In Warshaw v.
Calhoun, 213 A.2d 539 (Del.Ch. 1965), a minority shareholder of a personal holding
company complained that the controlling shareholder was depressing the stock value of
the company by maintaining too large of an investment stake in a portfolio company. The
court held that the board is not required to reduce its investment stake. Id. at 542-43. Thus,
Warshaw unremarkably upholds managerial authority over a shareholder’s assertion of a
strategy to maximize profit.
144
490 A.2d 1059 (Del. 1985). “The very fact that the director wants to enhance
corporate profits is in part attributable to his desire to keep shareholders satisfied so that
they will not oust him.” Id. at 1074.
145
See Unocal v Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A2d 946, 955-56 (Del 1985); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
146
See supra Sections II.A and II.B.
147
Delaware: Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 1989 WL 79880 (Del.Ch.
1989); In re Resorts Intern. Shareholders Litigation, 1988 WL 92749 (Del.Ch. 1988); Katz v.
Oak Industries Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del.Ch. 1986); Moran v. Household Intern., Inc., 490 A.2d
1059 (Del. 1985). An important case in the takeover field, Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
Time Inc., is not included in this list because there was no explicit embrace of shareholder
primacy: “a board of directors, while always required to act in an informed manner, is not
under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term, even in the context
of a takeover.” 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).
States: Houser v. Philadelphia Gas Commission, 1986 WL 501533 (Pa.Ct. Common
Pleas 1986); El Paso Elec. Co. v. New Mexico Public Serv. Com'n, 706 P.2d 511, 513-14 (N.M.
1985); Alpert v. 28 Williams Street Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 28 (N.Y. 1984).
Federal: McCain v. Phoenix Resources, Inc., 1989 WL 146212, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Newell Co. v. Vermont American Corp., 725 F.Supp. 351, 375 (N.D.Ill. 1989); Estate of
Detwiler v. Offenbecher, 728 F.Supp. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Gray v. Zondervan Corp., 712
F.Supp. 1275, 1281-82 (W.D.Mich. 1988); Gillette Co. v. RB Partners, 693 F.Supp. 1266, 1274
(D.Mass. 1988); Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938, 948 (2d Cir. 1988); Terrydale Liquidating
Trust v. Barness, 846 F.2d 845, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1988); Desert Partners, L.P. v. USG Corp., 686
F.Supp. 1289, 1297(N.D.Ill. 1988); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 235 (1988); Samjens
Partners I v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 663 F.Supp. 614, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Champion
Parts Rebuilders, Inc. v. Cormier Corp., 650 F.Supp. 87, 88-89 (N.D.Ill. 1986); Harvard
Industries, Inc. v. Tyson, 1986 WL 36295, at *2 (E.D.Mich. 1986); Spinner Corp. v. Princeville
Development Corp., 1986 WL 15545, at *8 (D. Hawaii 1986); Dynamics Corp. of America v.
CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1986); Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness, 642
F.Supp. 917, 923 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 638 F.Supp.
143
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Table 3: Non-Revlon cases in the 1980s
Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

Delaware
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1

Other States
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0

Federal
3
2
0
0
1
0
8
1
6
3

During the leveraged financed merger boom of the late 1980s and early
1990s, the debate on profit maximization was largely in the takeover arena.
Since then, the takeover arena has continued to be the focus of the debate
on the purpose of the corporation and shareholder wealth maximization.148
The years 1985-1986 mark an inflection point, at which time courts began to
opine on shareholder primacy and the trend has been unabated since then
(see Charts 2 and 3).
The rise of shareholder primacy is also marked by a significant shift in
lexicon. Before the mid-1980s, when courts discussed shareholder profit,
they tended to use the word choice “increasing” or “enhancing” profit,
indicating an obligation to make a profit without stating a maximand or
prioritizing the purpose of a corporation. Since 1985, “maximizing” profit
has become the dominant term in the conversation in corporate transactions
and litigation, which reflects the belief held by shareholders and

802, 805 (N.D.Ill. 1986); Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 255 (7th
Cir. 1986); Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 635 F.Supp. 1174, 1179 (N.D.Ill. 1986);
Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 128 (7th Cir. 1984); General Portland, Inc. v. LaFarge Coppee
S.A., 1981 WL 1408 (N.D.Tex. 1981); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 294 (7th
Cir. 1981); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 518 F.Supp. 390, 407 (N.D.N.Y. 1980);
Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980); United Operating Co. v. Karnes, 482
F.Supp. 1029, 1030-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
148
See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del.
1994); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990); William T.
Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging
the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1071 (2002); Allen, supra note 142, at 263.
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management.149 Chart 4 tracks the use of the term “maximize” in federal
and state judicial opinions from the period 1900‒2016 as a percentage of
total cases indicating an obligation to “increase,” “enhance,” or “maximize”
shareholder profit.
Chart 4: Percentage of "Maximization" Lexicon
100%
80%
60%
40%

20%
0%

The shift in rhetoric is definitionally and legally significant. Enhance is
defined as an increase. 150 Maximize is defined as an increase to a
maximum, 151 and it connotes the economic concept of a maximand. The
choice of term has legal significance. Corporate law statutes of all fifty states
and the Model Business Corporation Act do not mandate the purpose of the
business corporation. However, the American Law Institute’s Principles of
Corporate Governance addresses the issue. It provides: “a corporation
should have its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to
enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”152 The ALI choice of the
term “enhancing” was deliberate. It reveals a reluctance to embrace a strong
form of shareholder primacy; or stated more strongly, it rejects economic
efficiency as the purpose of the corporation.153 Thus, the sudden shift in the
judicial choice of terms in the mid-1980s reveals an awareness and embrace
of the concept of maximand.
The term “profit maximization” has long been in public and academic discussion.
See, e.g., GALBRAITH, supra note 3, at 113 (1967).
150
WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 413 (1986).
151
Id. at 734.
152
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01 (1994)
(emphasis added).
153
Bratton, supra note 5, at 714. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01(b)(2), (3) (1994) (discussing ethical implications of
shareholder primacy).
149
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C. Integration and Dutification
The nature of the judicial discussion has evolved with judicial embrace
of the concept of shareholder primacy becoming stronger over time. To
show this phenomenon, this article categorizes non-Revlon cases into four
types of cases reflecting various degrees of judicial embrace. Recognition
indicates cases where the court states as a point of fact or observation that
directors or shareholders seek to maximize profit, thus recognizing
shareholder primacy at the factual level of business practice.154 Application
indicates cases where the court applies the concept of shareholder primacy
in the process of reasoning toward the case holding or issue resolution.155
Integration indicates cases where the court uses the concept as a rationale
for another principle or rule of corporate law, thus integrating the concept
into the rule of law.156 Dutification indicates cases where the court prescribes
profit maximization as a managerial obligation, thus clearly expressing
shareholder primacy as a legal obligation.157
These four categories present an increasing spectrum of judicial
endorsement of shareholder primacy: from embracing the concept at the
factual level to incorporating the principle at the level of law and legal
obligation. Chart 5 provides the number of cases by these four categories in
the period 1980 to 2019 (projected).
See, e.g., In re Dunkin' Donuts Shareholders Litigation, 1990 WL 189120, at *9
(Del.Ch. 1990) (“Stockholders, on the other hand, do not care if the bidder gets a ‘good
deal,’ they want the most compensation available for their holding in the company. As
recent cases in this Court illustrate, maximization of shareholder value is often achieved
through an auction of a target company.”).
155
See, e.g., In re IXC Communications, Inc. v. Cincinnati Bell, Inc., 1999 WL 1009174,
at *5 (Del.Ch. 1999) (“It seems that at this preliminary stage that, absent a complete review
of the facts, that the IXC board's judgments about what deals and offers might have been
more or less viable than others reflect a vigorous process for maximizing shareholder value.
I have not been presented facts that would allow me to conclude that the IXC board did
not exercise its best judgment in deciding which suitors merited serious consideration and
which ones perhaps did not.”).
156
See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del.Ch. 1986) (“It is the
obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the
corporation's stockholders; that they may sometimes do so ‘at the expense’ of others (even
assuming that a transaction which one may refuse to enter into can meaningfully be said
to be at his expense) does not for that reason constitute a breach of duty.”).
157
See, e.g., In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 20 (Del.Ch. 2013) (“Directors
of a Delaware corporation owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its stockholders
which require that they strive prudently and in good faith to maximize the value of the
corporation for the benefit of its residual claimants.”).
154
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Chart 5: State and Federal Non-Revlon Cases
35
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The number of total cases are increasing with time. The above chart
shows that cases in the categories of integration and dutification, the
highest level of judicial embrace, are increasing. Also, note that dutification
cases are a recent phenomenon, and since 2000 their numbers have
increased significantly.
The concept of shareholder primacy has been integrated into a number
of legal principles and rules of law. An example of integration is seen in In
re Pure Resources, Inc. Shareholders Litigation.158 The controlling shareholder
made a tender offer to minority shareholders with an intended backend
short-form merger. The court noted that there were two plausible options
for the standard of judicial review, the choice of which would be critical to
the outcome of any corporate litigation. 159 The Delaware chancery court
discussed the underlying policy and principle guiding the choice of rule.160
. . . Much of the judicial carpentry in the corporate law occurs
in this context, in which judges must supplement the broadly
enabling features of statutory corporation law with equitable
principles sufficient to protect against abuse and unfairness, but
not so rigid as to stifle useful transactions that could increase the
shareholder and societal wealth generated by the corporate form.
In building the common law, judges forced to balance these
concerns cannot escape making normative choices, based on
808 A.2d 421, 424 (Del.Ch. 2002) (Strine, V.C.).
Id. at 433. Compare Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110,
1117 (Del. 1994), with Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 39-40 (Del.
1996).
160
808 A.2d at 434-35 (emphasis added).
158
159
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imperfect information about the world. This reality clearly
pervades the area of corporate law implicated by this case. When a
transaction to buy out the minority is proposed, is it more
important to the development of strong capital markets to hold
controlling stockholders and target boards to very strict (and
litigation-intensive) standards of fiduciary conduct? Or is more
stockholder wealth generated if less rigorous protections are adopted,
which permit acquisitions to proceed so long as the majority has
not misled or strong-armed the minority? . . .
The court adopted the rule of law that advanced the policy consideration in
favor of profit maximization.161
The number of integration cases are significant and increasing. Many
corporate law doctrines, as well as doctrines from other fields of law such
as securities regulation, contracts, bankruptcy, and ERISA, have been
explicitly justified on the rationale of shareholder wealth maximization.
Difference in duties between nonprofit and for profit corporations.―Courts
have imposed different rules on public nonprofit entities. These rules are
justified on the rationale that nonprofit and for profit corporations have
different purposes. Managers of a business corporation are “guided by their
duty to maximize long term profit for the benefit of the corporation and the
shareholders.” 162 However, a nonprofit corporation’s purpose is not to
generate a profit and instead the board’s duty of loyalty is to pursue the
charitable or public benefit mission.163
Business judgment rule.―A foundational rule in corporate law is the
business judgment rule, which grants the board broad discretion to manage
the business and affairs of the corporation absent a showing of a breach of
fiduciary duty. The business judgment rule has been justified on the
rationale: “Through the business judgment rule, Delaware law encourages
corporate fiduciaries to attempt to increase stockholder wealth by engaging
in those risks that, in their business judgment, are in the best interest of the
corporation without the debilitating fear that they will be held personally
liable if the company experiences losses.”164
Id. at 444 (adopting the Solomon standard).
Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc., 112 S.W.3d 486, 503-04
(Tenn.App. 2002). Accord State ex rel. Little People's Child Development Center, Inc. v.
Little People's Child Development Center, Inc., 2009 WL 103509, at *7 (Tenn.App. 2009).
163
Summers, 112 S.W.3d at 503-04.
164
In re Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. S’holder Litig., 2011 WL 4826104, at *23 (Del.Ch.
2011) (quoting In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A.2d 106, 139
161
162
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Corporate charter.―Corporate charters permit corporations to pursue
profit maximization in diverse ways, subject to the requirement that the
corporation engage in “lawful business” and “lawful acts.”165
Shareholder voting rights.―A foundational rule in corporate law is that
shareholders have governance rights through voting. This rule has been
justified on the rationale that “[w]hat legitimizes the stockholder vote as a
decision-making mechanism is the premise that stockholders with
economic ownership are expressing their collective view as to whether a
particular course of action serves the corporate goal of stockholder wealth
maximization.”166
Derivative suits.―A foundational rule in corporate law is that
shareholders may bring a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation. This
form of action has been justified on the rationale that shareholders can
“pursue monitoring activities that are wealth increasing for the collectivity
(the corporation or the body of its shareholders).”167 Instrumental aspects
of derivative suits, such as attorney fees168 and the demand requirement169,
have been justified on the rationale of shareholder wealth.
Shareholder inspection rights.―Corporate law permits shareholders
certain inspection rights. A shareholder must have a credible basis for
showing mismanagement, waste, or wrongdoing for compel an inspection
of the books and records. This rule has been justified on the rationale that it
“maximizes stockholder value by limiting the range of permitted
stockholder inspections to those that might have merit.”170
Creditor’s standing to bring derivative suit.―A well-established rule in
(Del.Ch. 2009)). Accord In re Ambac Financial Group, Inc., 457 B.R. 299, 305 (S.D.N.Y. Bankr.
2011); In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del.Ch.
2009); Granada Investments, Inc. v. DWG Corp., 823 F.Supp. 448, 454 (N.D. Ohio 1993);
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 294 (7th Cir. 1981); Crouse-Hinds Co. v.
InterNorth, Inc., 518 F.Supp. 390, 407 (N.D.N.Y. 1980); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287,
292 (3d Cir. 1980).
165
In re Massey Energy Co., 2011 WL 2176479, at *20 & n.144 (Del.Ch. 2011) (citing
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 1.2, at 18 (1986)).
166
Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v. Kurz, 992 A.2d 377, 388 (Del. 2010). Accord In re
CNX Gas Corp. Shareholders Litigation, 4 A.3d 397, 416 (Del.Ch. 2010); Kurz v. Holbrook,
989 A.2d 140, 178-79 (Del.Ch. 2010).
167
In re Activision Blizzard, Inc., 86 A.3d 531, 548 (Del.Ch. 2014) (quoting Bird v. Lida,
Inc., 681 A.2d 399, 403 (Del.Ch.1996)). Accord Keller v. Estate of McRedmond, 495 S.W.3d
852, 868 (Tenn. 2016); Case Financial, Inc. v. Alden, 2009 WL 2581873, at *7 n.41 (Del.Ch.
2009).
168
In re Del Monte Foods Co. Shareholders Litigation, 2011 WL 2535256, at *14 n.5
(Del.Ch. 2011); In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 65 A.3d 1116, 1140 n.7
(Del.Ch. 2011).
169
Johnson v. Glassman, 950 A.2d 215, 220 (N.J.Super. 2008).
170
Seinfeld v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 125 (Del. 2006).
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corporate law is that creditors have standing to bring derivative suits for a
breach of fiduciary duty when a corporation is in insolvency. This rule has
been justified on the rationale that it comports with the “directors' duty to
maximize the value of the insolvent corporation for the benefit of all those
having an interest in it.”171
Maximization of residual value.―A related concept to a creditor’s
standing to bring a derivative action is the rule that requires a manager or
trustee to maximize the value of the firm in insolvency, including value as
to shareholders. This rule has been justified on the rationale that “strive in
good faith and on an informed basis to maximize the value of the
corporation for the benefit of its residual claimants, the ultimate
beneficiaries of the firm's value.” 172 This rationale is the same one that
supports profit maximization as the economically efficient goal, which is
the maximization of a firm’s residual value. Outside of insolvency, the
residual value in assets and earnings belong to shareholders.
Priority rule in bankruptcy.―A fundamental concept in bankruptcy and
corporate law is that creditors must be paid before shareholders. In
bankruptcy under the rule of absolute priority, creditors are paid first in the
order of seniority. In corporate law under the rule of limited liability, the
claims of creditors are protected ahead of shareholder interest in the
corporation. These rule are justified on the rationale: “Because, unlike
creditors and depositors, stockholders stand to gain a share of corporate
profits, stockholders should take the primary risk of the enterprise failing.
This scheme of priorities is consistent with the economic theory of

N. Am. Catholic Educ. Prog. Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 103 (Del.
2007). Accord In re AWTR Liquidation Inc., 548 B.R. 300, 328 n.12 (C.D.Cal. Bankr. 2016);
Caulfield v. Packer Group, Inc., 56 N.E.3d 509, 518 (Ill.App. 2016); Lichtenstein v. Willkie
Farr & Gallagher LLP, 120 A.D.3d 1095, 1097 (N.Y.Sup. 1st App.Div. 2014); In re Grace
Manor Health Care Facility, Inc., 2012 WL 1021036, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Bankr. 2012); Sanford
v. Waugh & Co., Inc., 328 S.W.3d 836, 845 (Tenn.Super. 2010); Production Resources Group,
L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 777, 787, 790-91 (Del.Ch. 2004); Official Committee
of Bond Holders of Metricom, Inc. v. Derrickson, 2004 WL 2151336, at *3 (N.D.Cal. 2004);
In re RSL COM PRIMECALL, Inc., 2003 WL 22989669, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. 2003).
172
Quadrant Structured Products Co., Ltd. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 172, 176 (Del.Ch.
2014) (quoting In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 40-41 (Del.Ch.2013)). Accord
Badii ex rel. Badii v. Metropolitan Hospice, Inc., 2012 WL 764961, at *9 (Del.Ch. 2012); In re
JL Building, LLC, 452 B.R. 854, 862 (D. Utah Bankr. 2011); In re C.W. Mining Co., 636 F.3d
1257, 1264-65 (10th Cir. 2011); In re Amcast Indus. Corp., 365 B.R. 91, 104 n.6, 107 n.7 (S.D.
Ohio 2007); Mukamal v. Bakes, 383 B.R. 798, 826 (S.D.Fla. 2007); In re Hechinger Investment
Co. of Delaware, 274 B.R. 71, 89 (D.Del. 2002); Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness, 846
F.2d 845, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1988).
171
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corporations.”173
Restructuring and exchange offers.―In a restructuring or other corporate
transactions, the economic value of debt instruments may be diminished to
enhance shareholder value. Such transactions are justified on the rationale:
“It is the obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the
long-run interests of the corporation's stockholders; that they may
sometimes do so ‘at the expense’ of others . . . does not for that reason
constitute a breach of duty.”174
Mergers and acquisitions.―The poison pill has long been used a takeover
defense. Courts have noted that the poison pill may have value maximizing
uses. 175 The poison pill has been justified on the rationale that it is
“plausibly related to the goal of stockholder wealth maximization.” 176 A
number of other issues and rules in the takeover context has been justified
on the rationale of shareholder profit maximization.177
Gaff v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 919 F.2d 384, 392 (6th Cir. 1990).
Katz v. Oak Industries Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del.Ch. 1986). Accord U.S. Bank Nat.
Ass'n v. Stanley, 297 S.W.3d 815, 820 (Tex.App. 2009).
175
Moore Corp. Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Services, Inc., 907 F.Supp. 1545, 1557
(D.Del. 1995) (citing City Capital Assoc. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del.Ch.1988)).
176
Cooperstock v. Pennwalt Corp., 820 F.Supp. 921, 924 (E.D.Pa. 1993). Accord Desert
Partners, L.P. v. USG Corp., 686 F.Supp. 1289, 1297(N.D.Ill. 1988); Dynamics Corp. of
America v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.).
177
See Employer Teamsters Local Nos. 175 & 505 Pension Trust Fund v. Caspersen,
2006 WL 435289, at *8 (N.J.Sup. 2006) (duty to inform in a merger “maximize[s] the value
obtained for their shareholders”); In re CompuCom Systems, Inc. Stockholders Litigation,
2005 WL 2481325, at *6 (Del.Ch. 2005) (“The reasons for the law's tolerance of [sale of
controlling stake] is clear―as the owner of a majority share, the controlling shareholder's
interest in maximizing value is directly aligned with that of the minority.”); Alessi v.
Beracha, 849 A.2d 939, 947 (Del.Ch. 2004) (“secrecy increases shareholder wealth” in the
context of sale of the company); Marcoux v. Prim, 2004 WL 830393, at *13 (N.C.Super. 2004)
("This Court must balance protecting shareholder rights with preserving the freedom of
shareholders to approve or block a proposed merger according to their own economic
interests. A standard that is too lenient in either direction can have adverse repercussions
on both shareholder rights and maximizing shareholder value."); Fulk v. Washington
Service Associates, Inc., 2002 WL 1402273, at *7 (Del.Ch. 2002) (noting the “the larger
question—how best to maximize value for the shareholders in a sale of the Company” in a
dissolution and liquidation); Blanchard v. Edgemark Financial Corp., 2000 WL 33223385,
at *3 (N.D.Ill. 2000) (“Secrecy maximizes shareholder wealth in the context of public
corporations by encouraging potential bidders to offer their most aggressive price on a
deal.”); ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 104-05 (Del.Ch. 1999) (noting that “the
Delaware law of mergers and acquisitions has given primacy to the interests of
stockholders in being free to maximize value from their ownership of stock without
improper compulsion from executory contracts entered into by boards”); Avon Products,
Inc. v. Chartwell Associates L.P., 738 F.Supp. 686, 689 & n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (explaining
certain statutory merger rules as presumably “an effort to maximize stockholder value”);
Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness, 642 F.Supp. 917, 923 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (indicating
173
174
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Shareholder proxy.―A proxy rule proposed by the SEC related to the
direct nomination and election of directors by shareholders was recently
litigated in a prominent case. The court struck down the proposed rule and
justified the decision on the rationale that the rule did not establish a
connection to “the goal of maximizing shareholder value . . . [and] the
privilege also leaves corporate officers freer to exercise their business
judgment in their shareholders’ best interests.”178
Contract privilege.―In some states, corporate officers are privileged to
interfere with contracts. This rule is justified on the rationale that the
“privilege maximizes firm value by incentivizing officers to prioritize the
interests of shareholders over those of contract creditors.”179
ERISA.―Courts circumscribe the exercise of discretion of an ERISA
plan administrator and engages in judicial review of the administrator’s
conduct. This rule is justified on the rationale that “as the insurer, [it] reaps
the financial rewards of its claims decisions, and, as a subsidiary of a
publicly held and traded corporation, has a conflicting fiduciary obligation
to maximize profits for the benefit of shareholders.”180
In conclusion, a review of the above integration cases shows that
shareholder primacy is like a filamentary principle that weaves through
many important rules of corporate law and the corporate system. Courts
have recognized that shareholder profit is the rationale for many important
or foundational rules of corporate law.
In addition to integration cases, the case law also shows the beginning,
perhaps, of explicit rule of law emerging in the form of an unconditional
obligation to maximize shareholder wealth. This is a recent phenomenon.
Before 2000, there were no dutification cases. In the period 2000‒2009, there
were a handful of dutification cases.181 In the period 2010‒2016, such cases

that defensive tactics should have “a plausible measure for maximizing shareholder
wealth”); Alpert v. 28 Williams Street Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 28 (N.Y. 1984) (freeze-out
merger must “ultimately seek to increase the individual wealth of the remaining
shareholders”).
178
Business Roundtable v. S.E.C., 647 F.3d 1144, 1150, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
179
Service By Air, Inc. v. Phoenix Cartage and Air Freight, LLC, 78 F.Supp.3d 852, 864
(N.D.Ill. 2015).
180
O'Bryhim v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 1999 WL 617891, at *7 (4th Cir. 1999).
181
E*TRADE Financial Corp. v. Deutsche Bank AG, 631 F.Supp.2d 313, 377 (S.D.N.Y.
2009); Rodriguez v. Loudeye Corp., 189 P.3d 168, 174-75 (Wash.App. 2008); Kreinberg v.
Dow Chemical Co., 2007 WL 2782060, at *4 (E.D.Mich. 2007); Jasinover v. Rouse Co., 2004
WL 3135516, at *9 (Md.Cir.Ct. 2004).
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have increased significantly, both in Delaware182 and other jurisdictions.183
The 2010 Delaware chancery court opinion in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v.
Newmark seems to have ushered in a new period in which courts have
become comfortable with linking shareholder wealth maximization to a
generalized statement of a board’s obligation.184 Notably, excepting Revloninvoked cases, explicit statements about shareholder profit maximization
and the conception of corporate purpose tied to the private property model
of the corporation were largely absent in the prior decades.185
The number of dutification cases is caveated by two facts. First, all post2009 dutification cases are trial court opinions. 186 Second, although
Delaware has seen a sharp increase in dutification cases after eBay Domestic
Virtus Capital L.P. v. Eastman Chemical Co., 2015 WL 580553, at *16 & n.5 (Del.Ch.
2015) (Laster, V.C.); In re Rural/Metro Corp. Stockholders Litigation, 102 A.3d 205, 253-53
(Del.Ch. 2014) (Laster, V.C.); Allen v. El Paso Pipeline GP Co., L.L.C., 113 A.3d 167, 179-80
(Del.Ch. 2014) (Laster, V.C.); In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54, 80 (Del.Ch. 2014) (Laster,
V.C.); In re Orchard Enterprises, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, 88 A.3d 1, 34-36 (Del.Ch. 2014)
(Laster, V.C.); In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 20, 37 (Del.Ch. 2013) (Laster,
V.C.); Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 668 (Del.Ch. 2012) (Laster, V.C.); eBay
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del.Ch. 2010) (Chandler, C.).
183
IBEW Local No. 129 Ben. Fund v. Tucci, 2015 WL 9275480, at *5 (Mass.Super. 2015);
Stilwell Value Partners, IV, L.P. v. Cavanaugh, 49 Misc.3d 1210(A) (N.Y.Sup. 2015); In re
Gulf Fleet Holdings, Inc., 2014 WL 4560441, at *12 (W.D.La. Bankr. 2014) (citing eBay
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del.Ch. 2010)); Nakkhumpun v. Taylor,
2014 WL 321156, at *5 (D.Colo. 2014); In re Gulf Fleet Holdings, Inc., 491 B.R. 747, 776
(W.D.La. Bankr. 2013) (citing eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 35
(Del.Ch. 2010)); KD Gretna Properties, LLC v. Decatur Realty Corp., 2013 WL 1288048, at
*5 (E.D.La. 2013); Giles v. ICG, Inc., 789 F.Supp.2d 706, 714 (S.D.W.Va. 2011); Akanthos
Capital Management, LLC v. CompuCredit Holdings Corp., 770 F.Supp.2d 1315, 1333
(N.D.Ga. 2011); In re Celestica Inc. Securities Litig., 2010 WL 4159587, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2010);
Nucor Corp. v. U.S., 675 F.Supp.2d 1340, 1348-49 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2010).
184
The specific language of profit maximization has been favorably cited. See
OptimisCorp v. Waite, 2015 WL 5147038, at *61 n.520 (Del.Ch. 2015) (Parsons, V.C.); Vitus
Capital L.P. v. Eastman Chemical Co., 2015 WL 580553, at *16 n.5 (Del.Ch. 2015) (Laster,
V.C.); Allen v. El Paso Pipeline GP Co., L.L.C., 113 A.3d 167, 179 (Del.Ch. 2014) (Laster,
V.C.); Quadrant Structured Products Co., Ltd. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 187 (Del.Ch. 2014)
(Laster, V.C.); In re Rural Metro Corp., 102 A.3d 205, 253, (Del.Ch. 2014) (Laster, V.C.); In
re Gulf Fleet Holdings, Inc., 2014 WL 4560441, at *12 (Bankr.W.D.La. 2014); In re Trados
Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 36 (Del.Ch. 2013) (Laster, V.C.); Klaassen v. Allegro Dev.
Corp., 2013 WL 5967028, at *11 (Del.Ch. 2013) (Laster, Ch.); In re Gulf Fleet Holdings, Inc.,
491 B.R. 747, 776 (Bankr.W.D.La. 2013); Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 668 (Del.Ch.
2012) (Laster, V.C.).
185
Not that long ago, Delaware jurists were writing that there were competing models
of the corporation with different views on the purpose of the corporation. See Allen et al.,
supra note 148, at 1075-77; Allen, supra note 142, at 264-66. See also supra note 142. Allen,
Jacobs and Strine suggested that Delaware corporate was equivocal and did not strongly
embraced either the property or entity models. Allen et al., supra note 148, at 1078-79.
186
See supra notes 182-183.
182
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Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, all cases are attributable to a single vice
chancellor. 187 However, he is not alone in the Delaware judiciary in his
enthusiasm for the idea. Chief Justice Strine has written in a recent law
review article that “corporate law requires directors, as a matter of their
duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to maximize profits for the
stockholders.”188 Of course, it is an addition step to go from sole authoring
a law review article to announcing a rule in the majority opinion of a state
supreme court. Thus far, a duty to maximize profit has not been announced
by the Delaware supreme court, but its chief justice saying so publicly is of
course important.
IV. THE LEGAL MECHANISM OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
The above empirical evidence shows that shareholder primacy is not
independent of law. It has a legal foundation. In much of social interactions,
law per prescription or proscription is a driving force of behavior. Yet,
shareholder primacy clearly does not and cannot work doctrinally through
a rule‒sanction of duty. Academically Dodge v. Ford may be iconic, but
doctrinally the case is irrelevant. It is farfetched to believe that a rarely cited,
hundred year-old case from Michigan could have actually influenced
business and economic history to its current state. When juxtaposed with
the empirical data, the hypothesis tells a story that Dodge v. Ford remained
dormant and ineffective for the first sixty years since its publication in 1919
only to have suddenly become prophetic in the past thirty years, though it
has never been cited much outside of law review articles. This narrative of
its impact does not make sense. In truth, appellate courts have not imposed
a duty to maximize profit, the breach of which would subject a board to a
cognizable derivative action, judicial review of substantive business
decisions, and potential liability. Courts have not embraced this form of
law. Therefore, a positive legal theory must answer: Is shareholder primacy
law? If so, how does the law work?
A. Defining “Norm”
Corporate law scholarship refers to shareholder primacy as a norm,
which is really a short-hand for saying that a rule‒sanction framework does
not exist and thus a norm must be at work. The subject of social norms has
187
188

See supra note 182 (citing opinions written by Vice Chancellor Travis Laster).
Strine, supra note 4, at 136.
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generated significant scholarship.189 For the purpose of this article, Richard
Posner provides a workable, generally accepted definition by scholars in
the field:
Laws are promulgated by public institutions, such as legislatures,
regulatory agencies, and courts, after well-defined deliberative
procedures, and are enforced by the police power of the state,
which ultimately means by threat of violence. Norms are not
necessarily promulgated at all. If they are, it is not by the state.
Often a norm will result from (and crystallize) the gradual
emergence of a consensus. . . . A norm is a social rule that does not
depend on government for either promulgation or enforcement.190
There are other definitions of a norm, such as the philosophical concept
of “ought” and the mathematical concept of probabilistically consistent
behavior,191 but many leading scholars in the study of law and social norms
define norms as a community-prescribed behavior enforced through some
means other than the threat of governmental sanction.192
The labeling of shareholder primacy as a norm is consistent with the
above definition. Shareholder primacy is said to be a “principle,”193 “belief
system,” 194 or “ideology” 195 that has broad community support for its
normative content.196 It is not enforceable by law through statute or judicial
order. Its legitimacy, it is believed, is based on a norm, originated from the
persuasiveness of economic theories and policy arguments, internalized by
See, e.g., SOCIAL NORMS, NONLEGAL SANCTIONS, AND THE LAW (ed. Eric A. Posner,
2007); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991). Scholars have studied norms at work in commercial law. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra
note 11; Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
190
Richard A. Posner, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions,
19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 369, 369-70 (1999).
191
Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947, 954-55
(1997). See HART, supra note 10, at 44, 55 (discussing “customs” and “habits” as distinct
from obligations); Green, supra note 12, at 517 (“Not all practice rules are obligationimposing, however; most are just ordinary customs and conventions.”).
192
See Cooter, supra note 191, at 9550; Sunstein, supra note 122, at 915; Oliver Hart,
Norms and the Theory of the Firm, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1701, 1701 (2001); Ellickson, supra note
123, at 3; Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of
Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1579-80 (2000).
193
Allen et al., note 148, at 1079.
194
Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J.
CORP. L. 975, 977 (2006).
195
STOUT, supra note 5, at 2.
196
See supra notes 6 and 55 and accompanying text.
189
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the business community and presumably enforced through non-state
censure. 197 This widely-perceived account is inaccurate because it
diminishes the role of courts and the centrality of law in imposing an
obligation on managers. Logic alone suggests this: If corporate governance
is founded on law, we should expect one of its fundamental tenets to be
founded on the law and the legal system. Experience confirms this: Courts
have embraced shareholder primacy over a thirty-year period. This fact is
not without legal effect. Shareholder primacy is not just a norm, such as
taking off one’s hat in a house of worship or rising for the national anthem,
conduct that are widely observed, not because of a legal obligation, but
because of social pressure and internalization of custom. Shareholder
primacy ultimately derives its legitimacy from judicial acceptance and the
obligation it creates demands compliance.
The missing idea in a positive legal theory of shareholder primacy is that law
can be expressed by the government as an obligation without formal sanction if the
application of such police power would undermine other important rules and a
sanction is not needed to achieve efficacy of the law’s prescription.
B. Shareholder Primacy as Obligation
Shareholder primacy is not a legal duty, but is instead a legal
obligation. 198 H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law provides an insight into
obligations that rise to law. In theorizing the jurisprudential question “what
is law?” he critiqued Austin’s idea of law as a general command backed by
the coercive force of the threat of government. 199 Austinian form of law
aptly describes fields such as criminal law, torts, and regulated industries,
which are constructed on the idea of duty, breach, and sanction. 200
Fiduciary duties of corporate managers, being liability rules, are also in this
form of duty-based rules enforceable through sanction.201
However, some laws are not in Austinian form. A law can be either
unenforceable or simply enabling. A particularly relevant example in the
field of business organizations is laws that “confer legal powers on private

See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
199
HART, supra note 10, at 18-25. See Green, supra note 12, at 517 (“sanction theories
are now nearly friendless”).
200
Id. at 27.
201
See supra note 36.
197
198
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individuals.”202 Corporate law is said to be enabling, characterized in large
parts by its power to enable a set of privately ordered legal and economic
relationships among corporate constituents.203 Thus, the Austinian concept
of law does not fully describe other forms of law.204
A rule imposes an obligation when the general demand for conformity
is insistent and the social pressure brought to bear upon those who deviate
is great. 205 Social customs and obligations differ on the degree of social
pressure: “What is important is that the insistence on importance or
seriousness of social pressure behind the rules is the primary factor
determining whether they are thought of as giving rise to obligations.”206
An obligation is supported not only by a general demand for compliance
and social pressure, but also such demand for compliance is considered a
legitimate response to deviations. 207 An obligation is mandatory, which
distinguishes it from other norms.208
HART, supra note 10, at 28. These laws include contracts, wills, and marriages. Id.
at 27. They also include the laws of non-corporate entities that provide greater contractual
flexibility than the corporate form. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (“It is the
policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract
and to the enforceability of limited liability company agreements.”). See also LARRY E.
RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 37 (2010) (suggesting that LLCs “have real
contracts” unlike corporations).
203
Shintom Co., Ltd. v. Audiovox Corp., 888 A.2d 225, 227 (Del. 2005); Williams v.
Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996); William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in
Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1400 (1993). The idea of enabling contractual
relationship in a firm is seen in economic theories of the firm, which formed the basic ideas
of law and economic conception of corporate law. See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J.
POL. ECON. 288, 290 (1980).
204
HART, supra note 10, at 79-81.
205
Id. at 86-87. Other scholars have been influenced by Hart’s idea of an effective
obligation. See Cooter, supra note 191, at 955 & n.45.
206
HART, supra note 10, at 87 (emphasis in original).
207
H.L.A. Hart, Answers to Eight Questions, in READING HLA HART’S THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 283 (Luis Duarte D’Almeida ed., 2013). “What is necessary is that there should be a
critical reflective attitude to certain patterns of behaviour as a common standard, and that
this should display itself in criticism (including self-criticism), demands for conformity,
and in acknowledgments that such criticism and demands are justified, all of which find
their characteristic expression in the normative terminology of ‘ought’, ‘must’, and ‘should’,
‘right’ and ‘wrong’.” HART, supra note 10, at 57. See id. at 90 (“the violation of a rule is not
merely a basis for the prediction that a hostile reaction will follow but a reason for the
hostility”).
208
Kenneth Einar Himma, A Comprehensive Hartian Theory of Legal Obligation: Social
Pressure, Coercive Enforcement, and the Legal Obligation of Citizens, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE NATURE OF LAW, at 162, 166 (eds. Wil Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa,
2013). See Sunstein, supra note 123, at 914 (describing Hart’s concept of legal obligations as
a subclass of norms).
202
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In a legal system, the government, such as the judiciary, applies rules
of recognition to determine obligations, such as when common law courts
determine the rule of law. A court may observe general characteristics
possessed by an obligation and its “relation to judicial decisions.”209 Courts
do not always state the rule applied to recognize an obligation, but instead
it is frequently shown in the decision: thus, “when courts reach a particular
conclusion on the footing that a particular rule has been correctly identified
as law, what they say has a special authoritative status conferred on it by
other rules.”210 The identification of a rule in the legal system validates the
obligation.211 Validity of a rule differs from its efficacy. 212 If law is more
than the Austinian concept, it requires a dissociation of validity from
efficacy because an obligation may not always be sanctionable and thus
enforced. 213 However, the internalization of a rule as a legal obligation
presuppose the truth of a legal system that is “generally efficacious.”214
Shareholder primacy is more than a social custom or social norm. It is
a legal obligation in the Hartian tradition: it is an important rule imbued
with a “seriousness of social pressure” though it is not enforceable; it is
recognized and institutionalized by courts; it is said to be foundational to
corporate law and governance. The reprobation directed at one who
deviates from the rule would be considered legitimate. This social pressure
may be inconsistent at times with the corporate manager’s own value
system, but nevertheless she may feel compelled to obey the rule.215 Thus,
outlier cases like Dodge v. Ford and eBay v. Newmark are insubstantial at the
instrumental level of doctrine;216 their significance is at the expressive level.

HART, supra note 10, at 95.
Id. at 101-02.
211
Id. at 103. See Roscoe E. Hill, Legal Validity and Legal Obligation, 80 YALE L.J. 47, 51
(1970) (“In Hart’s system, therefore, a legal rule of obligation (imposing legal obligation) is
created whenever the relevant officials make the appropriate manipulations under the
secondary rules of the legal system.”).
212
HART, supra note 10, at 103.
213
d. at 217-18.
214
Id. at 103-04.
215
Hart adds two other characteristics of an obligation: (1) the obligation is thought
to be important “because they are believed to be necessary to the maintenance of social life
or some highly prized feature of it”; (2) the obligation, while benefiting others, may
“conflict with what the person who owes the duty may wish to do” and thus it is “thought
of as characteristically involving sacrifice or renunciation.” Id. at 87. See Green, supra note
12, at 517. In this sense, an obligation demands compliance. See supra note 208.
216
As categorized in the empirical analysis here, these cases are the “application”
cases. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. The courts applied the concept of
209
210
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They legitimize shareholder primacy through a judicial rebuke of perceived
deviations from a legal obligation.217 The opinions are consistent with the
large body of judicial literature across many jurisdictions and over several
decades. Furthermore, the recent rise of dutification cases in lower court
opinions are not a signal of a move toward an enforceable duty.218 Instead,
they unambiguously express the judicial expectation of the obligation. They
function at the level of expressive value.219 The rule of law, not social norm,
has resulted in today’s strongly shareholder-centric economic orientation
in corporate governance.
Shareholder primacy also has both external and internal aspects. The
volume of judicial literature over several decades clearly show that courts
have recognized shareholder primacy. Courts accept arguments based on
shareholder primacy; they embrace the concept as a part of the reasoning
process toward judicial outcomes; they incorporate the concept in other
principles and rules of corporate law. The rule of shareholder primacy is
not simply a pronouncement by a few courts or even important courts such
as Delaware’s. In this sense, it is not simply the occasional dictum of judicial
rumination on best practices, which would not rise to the level of a rule of
law. Instead, courts have embraced the obligation pervasively, across many
jurisdictions, and over several decades. The weight and seriousness of the
concept is apparent. These collective judicial actions have recognized a legal
obligation. This obligation has been internalized by managers and
shareholders.220 Courts have directed this internalization by focusing the
business community toward a single common objective. 221
shareholder primacy in the process of reasoning toward the case holding with respect to
the distribution of dividends and the application of a poison pill defense.
217
Ford’s honest confession of an altruistic motive earned the court’s rebuke. See
Strine, supra note 4, at 148; Macey, supra note 8, at 183.
218
See supra Section III.C. & Chart 5.
219
See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649,
1650-51 & n.2 (2000) (“The thesis is that law influences behavior independent of the
sanctions it threatens to impose, that law works by what it says in addition to what it
does.”); Sunstein, supra note 123, at 964 (“Many laws have an expressive function. They
‘make a statement’ about how much, and how, a good or bad should be valued. They are
an effort to constitute and to affect social meanings, social norms, and social roles.”).
220
See supra Sections III.B. and III.C.
221
“[L]aw facilitates coordination by making a particular outcome salient; law’s
requirements focus individuals’ attention on one way to coordinate, channeling their
behavior in that direction.” RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW 22
(2015). Coordination to a single objective is consistent with agency cost theory of the firm,
which says that an agent must be given a single objective, lest the agent will pursue his
own interest and agency cost will increase. Jensen, supra note 48, at 238; EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 51, at 38. Thus, shareholder primacy can be seen as a legal focal point
that coordinates the behavior of managers toward a single goal.
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Enforceability is not a precondition of efficacy. Unenforceability does
not inevitably result in inefficacy, and thus perhaps delegitimization. Most
commentators, including critics, conclude that shareholder primacy has
been internalized by a consensus of all relevant constituents.222 This fact
predicts significant compliance without the need for enforcement. Not all
laws are coupled with a meaningful sanction.223 Examples from other laws
show that law may work through expressive value.224 This is not to suggest
that regulatory rules without sanctions are a standard form of law. Most
regulations work through enforcement. Although much of corporate law
enables the private ordering of economic actors,225 shareholder primacy—
to the extent that it prescribes managerial behavior through a rule of law—
is regulatory in character.226 However, shareholder primacy cannot take the
form of a rule‒sanction because the structure of corporate law would
become internally incoherent.227 And, efficacy does not require this form of
law. A rule‒no sanction form is seen in law when a rule can still achieve
compliance through other means.228
C. Complete Shareholder Primacy

See supra note 6.
States have legislated a duty to rescue, which is contrary to the common law of
torts, but the sanctions are so light that these laws are best understood as having an
expressive function. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01(1); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 519; WISC.
STAT. § 940.34. There are laws against cursing in public with de minimis penalties. See MICH.
COMP. L. ANN. § 750.103; R.I. GEN. L. § 11-11-5. Federal statute prohibits disrespect of the
flag, but provides no penalty. 4 U.S.C. § 8(h). The field of international law must generally
contend with obligations without sanctions. See generally Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan
Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 421
(2000); Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
171 (2010).
224
See supra note 219.
225
See supra note 203.
226
On this point, there is apparent tension in corporate law. Statutory corporate law
is enabling in that it allows a corporation to pursue any lawful activity. See supra notes 19
& 203. However, case law is regulatory in that shareholder primacy obligates managers
through law to pursue profit maximization. This tension is resolved if the statute is read as
prohibiting a corporation from pursuing unlawful activities. See In re Massey Energy Co.,
2011 WL 2176479 (Del.Ch. 2011). Assuming that the corporation’s activity is lawful, the
corporation has an obligation under case law to maximize profit. Corporate law is
regulatory in this respect.
227
See supra Section I.B.
228
Leslie Green, Introduction, HART, supra note 10, at xxx.
222
223
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Court have imposed the obligation of shareholder primacy on the
entire spectrum of managerial decisions. Although this obligation is
unenforceable, it exerts serious social pressure to comply. But we are still
left with the question: How exactly is the pressure applied since an
unenforceable rule can be seen as a paper tiger? Why do managers obey a
rule that cannot be enforced against them?
We start with the basic premise: Shareholder primacy and primacy of
managerial authority cannot coexist in a rule‒sanction form. The legal
mechanism of shareholder primacy must solve a doctrinal puzzle: (1) the
primacy of managerial authority is a rule‒sanction, and as such it is a first
order rule in that it has independent dignity; (2) shareholder primacy is a
rule‒no sanction, and as such it is a second order rule in that it is
subordinate to any first order rule at the level of enforcement; (3) however,
the purpose of the first order rule is to serve the second order rule at the
level of prescription and substantive content, and as such the latter must be
efficacious in spite of the former. When the doctrinal and jurisprudential
problem is framed in this way, we see why the legal status of shareholder
primacy has been opaque for so long.229
As a matter of practice and theory, the law of shareholder primacy only
works as a coupling of first order and second order rules. The legal
mechanism of shareholder primacy resolves the tension between the two
rules. It enables the second order rule to exert a conditional obligation on
the first order rule and do so efficaciously.230 Compliance without sanction
achieves two important functions: it is efficient because there are no
additional litigation costs; and, it preserves the rule of managerial authority
and thus the coherence of the basic structure of corporate law.
The law and the legal system writ large achieve broad compliance
through the following pathways: legitimacy of obligation, positive and
negative incentives on managers, litigation risk imposed on managers, and
social norm in the business community.

229
230

See supra Section I.
See supra note 6 and Section III.A.
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Figure 2: Complete Shareholder Primacy
Legitimacy

Incentives

Efficacy

Norm

Litigation
Risk

First, corporate law and the legal system advance shareholder primacy
as a legal obligation through positive and negative incentives inherent in
performance-based executive compensation and the market for corporate
control, as well the imposition of duties toward shareholders in the Revlon
zone and inter-security conflicts.231 The combination of these laws partially,
but substantially, motivate managers to comply with shareholder wealth
maximization.
Second, empirical evidence shows that courts have pervasively and
over a long period embraced shareholder primacy. Courts have used the
concept of shareholder wealth maximization both at the factual and legal
levels of analysis. 232 This judicial embrace has legitimized shareholder
primacy and given it the cloak of legal authority.
Third, judicial recognition of an obligation creates legal uncertainty and
litigation risk for corporate managers. The incentive, then, is to comply with
the rule even though the obligation cannot be enforced as an independent
duty. Courts weigh whether a manager has complied with shareholder
primacy in the analysis of whether other rules were violated or not. Under
this consideration, compliance is simply the path of least resistance given
the negative incentives. The grant of fiduciary duty only to shareholder
ensures that only unsatisfied shareholders can bring a derivative suit
against managers when they fail to maximize profit.
Fourth, obligations can legitimize and strengthen norms. This
institutionalization of a social rule through a judicially announced

231
232

Supra Section II.
Supra Section III.
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obligation is critical to the need to obey and actual compliance. 233 Courts
have validated the normative policy rationale for shareholder primacy held
by the academic, policy, and business communities. Thus, alongside the
legal obligation, there is a norm in the community, and its strength is
measured by the degree of compliance with the principle of wealth
maximization even if there is little risk of a sanction for business decisions
falling within the business judgment rule.
When these four factors are considered in totality, the legal mechanism
of shareholder primacy is clear and complete. Corporate law achieves a
harmonization of the first order and second order rules with dual efficacy.
A board manages the business and affairs of the corporation, and she has
vast discretion under the business judgment rule to consider the balance of
interests among shareholders and other constituents. 234 The primacy of
managerial authority is enforceable in court, and courts frequently enforce
it in favor of management when shareholders seek to encroach upon
board’s authority. 235 Such enforcements in favor of management and
against shareholders is unremarkable. However, managerial behavior and
actions are nonetheless steered toward shareholder interest through
multiple rules, incentives, and justifications provided by courts and the
legal system.
The realm of all management decisions can be broadly categorized into
decisions relating to takeovers, financing, and operational decisions of a
going concern. In takeovers and financings, Revlon and inter-security
priority doctrines enforce shareholder primacy in the form of rule‒
sanction.236 Because these transactions typically involve significant monies,
the chance of avoiding detection and escaping judicial review are slim. The
threat of sanction is direct and real, which applies negative incentives.
Takeovers and financings, however, are specific transactions. The vast
Leslie Green argues that an account of obedience to law is grounded in part on the
law’s institutionalization.
233

First, law is institutionalized: it is the product not only of human thought
and action and in that sense a social construction; it is more significantly
the product of institutionalized thought and action. Nothing is law that is
not in some way connected with the activities of institutions such as
legislatures, courts, administrators, police, and so on. Neither ideal social
norms nor general social customs, but only an institutionally relevant
subset of these, count as law.
Green, supra note 12, at 523. See HART, supra note 10, at 103.
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See supra notes 33, 40 & 41 and accompanying text.
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majority managerial decisions are operational decisions made in the context
of a going concern. In this realm, managers have great discretion under the
first order rule of managerial authority to comply with the obligation of
shareholder primacy or not, depending on their preference or values (the
classic agency cost theory in corporate law). They are generally safe from
sanction since there is no enforceable duty. However, there are many nonsanction checks arising from law that constrain a manager’s virtually
unfettered discretion under the first order rule. The legal system provides
corporate manager’s carrot-and-stick incentives. Executive compensation
and the market for corporate control provide complementary incentives
and align shareholder and manager economic interests. In light of
normative arguments and the business community’s acceptance of them,
the path of least resistance—paved by courts—is also the internalized norm
of most managers. 237 These combined factors push managers toward
compliance with the rule of law.238
Although there is no duty to maximize profit, the threat of real sanction
exists, albeit indirectly. Managers understand that other rules of corporate
law exist in a rule‒sanction form. Those rules are connected to the principle
of shareholder primacy. For example, Revlon applies only in a change of
control context, but the context may be open-textured and the precise
geography of Revlon remains uncertain. In any takeover transaction where
a change of control is arguable, corporate managers are incentivized to
maximize shareholder profit. The decisions in Dodge v. Ford and eBay
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark are prime examples of indirect sanction
through other enforceable rules (viz. rules on dividend distributions and
takeover defenses), since it is clear in both cases that the court rebuked the
controlling shareholders’ rejection of the profit motive.239
Courts have applied and integrated the concept to the legal reasoning
process and rule justification.240 It would be reasonably apparent to a board,
typically advised by sophisticated corporate lawyers, that shareholder
primacy may be a factor in the liability determination of these rules. When
the boundaries of a rule is uncertain and the law is applied in an openSee Rock, supra note 72, at 1988 (“Managers now largely think and act like
shareholders.”).
238
See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, IMPACT: HOW LAW AFFECTS BEHAVIOR 5, 96217 (2016) (arguing that law affects behavior through three principal factors: positive and
negative incentives, peer pressure, and internalization of rules).
239
See supra note 216; Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its
Implementation under Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389, 425-30 (2014).
240
See supra Section III.C.
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ended and potentially ex ante indeterminate,241 law and economic literature
has shown that the uncertainty can lead to over-compliance as parties may
be incentivized to take additional precautions.242 Thus, there is always the
threat of indirect liability even though the legal form is a second order rule.
Finally, to understand the role of courts in creating the obligation of
shareholder wealth maximization, consider this counterfactual: What if,
over the period 1980‒2016, courts had pervasively rejected or softened the
idea of shareholder primacy? This alternative world is not so farfetched. In
the landmark case Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the majority Supreme
Court claimed that while “it is certainly true that a central objective of forprofit corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does not
require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything
else, and many do not do so.”243 Of course, it is not too cynical to believe
that this liberal-sounding statement was an instrumental rationale, unique
to the case and the issue of corporate religious liberty at hand.244 But in a
counterfactual world, what if courts across the land had consistently
admonished shareholders and managers that “modern corporate law does
not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of
Delaware law is contextual and open-ended, and thus indeterminate in outcomes.
See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 459; Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market
for LLC Law: A Theory of Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 224 (2011);
William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success,
2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 29 (2009).
242
See Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 280 (1986); John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of
Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 965 (1984). If uncertainty
is distributed normally around the optimal standard of care, the legal rule will have an
over-deterrence effect because a cost-benefit analysis may militate taking more precaution
at the margin to comply. Robert J. Rhee, On Duopoly and Compensation Games in the Credit
Rating Industry, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 85, 132 (2013).
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134 S.Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014).
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The Supreme Court has been trending toward a pro-business bias for several
decades. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the
Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1450, 1470-71 (2013). From the perspective of
corporate law, the above quoted language in Hobby Lobby sounds liberal in its rejection of
a singular profit motive, but the case is unquestionably a pro-business decision because it
expands corporate personhood and rights. All five Justices in the majority (Alito, Roberts,
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everything else” and had reasoned through and decided cases based on this
principle? There would not have been a legal obligation to maximize profit.
Corporate governance and perceptions of legal obligations are products of
corporate law, and courts have the power to create or validate a rule of law.
Since law can legitimize or delegitimize social norms, there would not even
have been a strong norm in the business community. Instead, there would
have been only schools of intellectual thought in the academic community.
CONCLUSION
Shareholder primacy is law, and not just a social norm. Case law since the
1980s shows that courts have embraced the concept. The legal mechanism of
shareholder primacy is not a single locus rule‒sanction form. It is in the
form of a legal obligation. Courts have legitimized and imposed the
obligation to maximize shareholder profit across the entire spectrum of
managerial decisionmaking. The principle weaves through a series of
corporate law rules and the architecture of the corporate and market
systems. A legal obligation is the only form of law that is coherent in light
of the primacy of managerial authority. By legitimizing shareholder
primacy without creating a duty, the law harmonizes the conflict between
authority and accountability.
The legal mechanism that begets and advances the idea of shareholder
wealth maximization is complex, efficacious, and efficient. It is complex
because it must harmonize the coupling of first order and second order
rules that is unique to corporate law while respecting the independent
dignity of both rules. It is efficacious because the rule of law has been
internalized without the coercion of sanctions. It is efficient because the rule
achieves compliance at systematic, predictable levels at minimal cost.
Whether the rule is socially efficient, equitable, or ethical—all contestable
points—is in the domain of a normative theory. However, the normative
debate and policy prescription must be informed by a positive theory of
law. Whether law exists or not matters. The cause and effect of shareholder
primacy rests on a legal foundation, and not some general notion of
collective social belief that perhaps can change with enough suasion or
argument. Any policy prescription from a normative theory must address
the fact that there is a law of shareholder primacy.

